

The Authoritarian Personality and the Organization of Attitudes

In 1934 Hitler became chancellor of Germany. In 1938 E. R. Jaensch, a psychologist and also a Nazi, published the book *Der Gegentypus*. This book reported the discovery of a consistent human type—the *Gegentypus* or Anti-Type. The Anti-Type was also called the S-Type because Jaensch found that he was synaesthetic: one who enjoys concomitant sensation, a subjective experience from another sense than the one being stimulated, as in color hearing. Synaesthesia, which we are likely to regard as a poet's gift, seemed to Jaensch to be a kind of perceptual slovenliness, the qualities of one sense carelessly mixed with those of another. In other perceptual tasks Jaensch found the Anti-Type to be characterized by ambiguous and indefinite judgments and to be lacking in perseverance.

On the assumption that personalities manifest a *Stileinheit*, or "unity of style," Jaensch filled out his characterization of the S-Type more from imagination than evidence. The S would be a man with so-called "liberal" views; one who would think of environment and education as the determinants of behavior; one who would take a childish wanton pleasure in being eccentric, S would say "individualistic." S would be flaccid, weak, and effeminate. His general instability would be likely to stem from a

racially mixed heredity. Jews are Anti-Types and "Parisians" and Orientals and communists.

The contrasting personality, an ideal for Jaensch, was the J-Type. J made definite, unambiguous perceptual judgments and persisted in them. He would recognize that human behavior is fixed by blood, soil, and national tradition. He would be tough, masculine, firm; a man you could rely on. His ancestors would have lived from time immemorial in the North German space and within the North German population; it would be these ancestors who had bequeathed him his admirable qualities. J made a good Nazi Party member.

In 1950, in the United States, *The Authoritarian Personality* was published. The research reported in this book undertook to discover the psychological roots of anti-Semitism. The anti-Semite in America turned out to be generally ethnocentric, generally antagonistic to groups other than his own because he thought of these groups as having various disagreeable innate qualities. Politically the anti-Semite tended to be conservative, a firm believer in "free enterprise," nationalistic, a friend of business and an enemy of labor unions. A person with this combination of opinions sounded like a potential Fascist. The authoritarian type in his perception and thought appeared to be rigid and intolerant of ambiguity. He was, more or less, Jaensch's J-Type, but J, who was a hero to Nazi social science, was a villain to American social science. What Jaensch called "stability" we called "rigidity" and the flaccidity and eccentricity of Jaensch's despised Anti-Type were for us the flexibility and individualism of the democratic equalitarian. The typologies of Jaensch and of the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* were much the same but the evaluations were different.

The Authoritarian Personality had the greatest possible relevance to the social issues of its day. The Soviet Union had been our ally in the war against fascism. American intellectuals generally accepted the Marxist interpretation of fascism as a movement of the extreme political right, as a conservatism driven to desperation by the economic problems of capitalism. The Equalitarian opposite to the Authoritarian held the leftish liberal views of a New Dealer in the 1930's. They were views common to humane liberals, to Henry Wallace's Progressive Party, to non-Stalinist communists, the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality*, and most American social psychologists. The Equalitarian was ourselves and the Authoritarian the man in our society whom we feared and disliked.

The research reported in *The Authoritarian Personality* was done at the University of California at Berkeley. The work was subsidized by the Department of Scientific Research of the American Jewish Committee. One of the authors of the book, a social psychologist with very great talent, was Else Frenkel-Brunswik. Mrs. Brunswik and her husband, the

eminent psychologist Egon Brunswik, had been students and teachers at the University of Vienna during the period in which Hitler rose to power. They were Jews and well acquainted with anti-Semitism.

After the War, came the realignment of world powers into communist and democratic blocs. In this country the wartime solidarity with Russia was forgotten and Soviet Communism replaced German fascism as the principal villain in world affairs. American intellectuals were not as ready as the national majority to anathematize communists; the two fascist themes of prejudice and political reaction seemed worse evils to us. One of the first indications of general American anxiety about internal communism was the decision of the Regents of the University of California to require a loyalty oath of all its faculty members. This seemed to most of us an egregious infringement of academic freedom and we sympathized with those who refused to sign. We were generally alarmed by the communism phobia which at length led to McCarthyism and to the stigmatization of liberal intellectuals as "eggheads."

Unquestionably there was some gratification for American social psychology during this period in the theory of the authoritarian personality which exposed the fear, the stupidity, and the sadism in nationalistic and reactionary politics. Was there perhaps also some distortion of truth in the service of values? If so, it was not so blatant as Jaensch's, not so obviously unsupported by evidence, not in the service of the state, perhaps not there at all. Still the authors of the 1950 study were not much interested in what has come to be called authoritarianism of the left. Interest in authoritarianism of the left apparently had to wait upon a change of the political climate, a time when disillusionment with communism was general among American intellectuals. It is not easy to do sound social psychological research on contemporary issues because any finding is, in these circumstances, a social force. The study called *The Authoritarian Personality* has affected American life: the theory of prejudice it propounded has become a part of popular culture and a force against racial discrimination. Is it also true? You must judge.

The Widening Circle of Covariation

In 1946 Jean-Paul Sartre published his *Réflexions sur la Question Juive* which appeared in English in 1948 under the title *Anti-Semite and Jew*. The null hypothesis, which is disproved by *The Authoritarian Personality* is, by coincidence, also Sartre's null hypothesis. He puts it this way:

"At the same time, [accustomed as we have been since the Revolution to look at every object in an analytic spirit, that is to say, as a composite whose elements can be separated, we look upon persons or characters as

mosaics in which each stone coexists with the others without that co-existence affecting the nature of the whole. Thus anti-Semitic opinion appears to us to be a molecule that can enter into combination with other molecules of any origin whatsoever without undergoing any alteration. A man may be a good father and a good husband, a conscientious citizen, highly cultivated, philanthropic, and in addition an anti-Semite. He may like fishing and the pleasures of love, may be tolerant in matters of religion, full of generous notions on the condition of the natives in Central Africa, and in addition detest the Jews" (p.8).

Both Sartre and the California researchers conclude that the above statements are not true: a man who holds anti-Semitic opinions will reliably hold certain other opinions quite different from the opinions of a man who is not anti-Semitic. This is the discovery of the first part of the book. The later parts tell us what kind of a husband, father, and citizen the anti-Semite is.

Two kinds of behavior are said to covary when a change in one is associated in some regular way with a change in the other. The thousand pages of *The Authoritarian Personality* tell the story of behavior that covaries with attitudes toward Jews. The account moves from anti-Semitic attitudes to ethnocentric ideology to political and economic conservatism to implicit antidemocratic trends to needs and traits revealed in interviews, TAT stories, and answers to projective questions. It is all an account of covariation, of how one kind of behavior is associated with another.

In following the ever widening circle that centers on anti-Semitism we will cross one major methodological boundary. Anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, political and economic conservatism, and implicit antidemocratic trends are all assessed with fixed-alternative questionnaires. In the remainder of the work, research methods are used which do not provide alternative responses but leave the subject free to construct his own answer; these include interviews, requests to tell stories about pictures, and requests to respond to projective questions. The fixed-alternative questionnaire item is like the multiple-choice examination question and the open-ended inquiry is like an essay question. Scoring the former is a mechanical process but the latter requires trained judgment and is handled by a method called content analysis.

The fixed-alternative questionnaire is primarily a method of survey research and the first part of the study is essentially an opinion survey. Interviews, TAT's, and projective questions are primarily methods of clinical psychology and the second part of the study is essentially a clinical investigation of a small number of persons. The subjects for the clinical inquiry were selected on the basis of their scores on the Ethnocentrism (E) Scale; they were high scorers and low scorers, ideological extremes.

One of the innovations of *The Authoritarian Personality* was the combination in one study of the two kinds of method.

In addition to crossing a methodological boundary we will in this study cross a conceptual boundary; the two boundaries are related but not exactly coincident. The data are all verbal behavior, answers to questions of one kind or another. However, the authors of the Berkeley research conceptualized the data in two ways. They were, in the first place, concerned with ideology which they thought of as an organization of opinions, attitudes, and values, in political, economic, and religious spheres. They were in the second place concerned with personality which they thought of in the Freudian tradition, as an organization of needs varying in quality, intensity, and object; needs sometimes in harmony and sometimes in conflict. It was the effort to relate ideology to personality that made the California study strikingly original.

It is natural to anticipate that the survey part of the study which used questionnaire items would yield the data on ideology and that the clinical part of the study would yield the data on personality. In fact the coincidence is not quite that sharp. The Anti-Semitism (A-S) Scale, the Ethnocentrism (E) Scale, and the Political and Economic Conservatism (PEC) Scale are all concerned with explicit ideology. However, the F Scale is concerned with personality. It represents an attempt to assess by questionnaire the personality trends that are also assessed by interview and by projective methods. The methodological-conceptual coincidence is further blurred by the fact that the interview protocols and the TAT stories contain some material that is relevant to attitudes and ideologies. Apart from the present study, fixed-alternative questionnaires have very often been used to elicit personality data and open-ended questions have come to be widely used in opinion surveys.

COVARIATION OF QUESTIONNAIRE DATA

The investigators obtained most of their subjects by approaching organizations and asking to survey opinions in the entire membership. Among the subjects of these surveys were students from the University of California, from the University of Oregon, and from George Washington University. There were public school teachers, public health nurses, San Quentin Prison inmates, patients at the Langley Porter Psychiatric Clinic, veterans' groups, labor union groups, and Kiwanis clubs. More than two thousand persons took one or another of the attitude scales. Data from members of important minority groups were deliberately excluded. The majority of the subjects could be characterized as white, non-Jewish, native-born, middle-class Americans and the authors guessed that their findings would hold for this population.

All of the questionnaire items written for the survey portion of the research assumed the same form; they are called, in the terminology of attitude scaling, Likert-type items. Subjects were asked to mark each statement according to the degree of their agreement or disagreement with it by using the following scale:

+1: slight support, agreement -1: slight opposition, disagreement
 +2: moderate support, agreement -2: moderate opposition, disagreement
 +3: strong support, agreement -3: strong opposition, disagreement

Notice that no zero position of neutrality was provided.

In what follows we will be describing the development by the Berkeley research group of four paper and pencil scales: the Anti-Semitism (A-S) Scale, the Ethnocentrism (E) Scale, the Political and Economic Conservatism (PEC) Scale, and the Implicit Antidemocratic Trends (F) Scale. In this work we will be chiefly interested in the way in which one sort of opinion is found to be associated with another, in the widening circle of correlation that suggests the existence of a general ideology of authoritarianism.

For each scale we shall be reporting four critical things: first, the authors' general definition of the attitudes being measured; second, some illustrative questionnaire items; third, a mean correlation between one-half of the items and the other half of the items (usually called a split-half reliability correlation). The split-half reliability correlation provides a rough indication of the degree to which the specific opinions within a scale tend to be associated one with another. It tells us, for instance, whether people who agree with one set of statements that express hostility to Jews also agree with another set of such statements. In the fourth place we will report the mean correlation between total scores on the new scale and total scores on all the scales previously developed. This value is a rough indication of the degree to which attitudes assessed by one scale tend to be associated with attitudes assessed by the other scales. This is the essential framework in what follows, though there are also incidental remarks to be made about each scale.

The Anti-Semitism (A-S) Scale. The investigators' general conception of anti-Semitism was that it consists in "stereotyped negative opinions describing the Jews as threatening, immoral, and categorically different from non-Jews, and of hostile attitudes urging various forms of restriction, exclusion, and suppression as a means of solving the "Jewish problem" (Adorno, et al., 1950, p. 71). They wrote fifty-two questionnaire items to tap this attitude. The authors classified their fifty-two items under five subheadings: 1) *offensive* items described Jews as conceited, sensual, dirty, and the like; 2) *threatening* items described them as ruthless, competitive, radical, and the like; 3) *attitudes* items recommended various dis-

criminative actions to be taken against the Jews; 4) *seclusive* items credited the "clannish" Jews with a desire to keep apart from gentiles; 5) *intrusive* items, on the other hand, attributed to Jews a desire to move in where they are not wanted.

All of the items were written so as to affirm an anti-Semitic opinion and so consistent agreement with items would produce a high A-S score. The authors discussed the possible objection to their procedure that a subject who was somehow "set" so as to agree with statements might mechanically produce a high score without in fact being intensely anti-Semitic. For various reasons they considered this unlikely but as we shall see, when we make a critique of the study, their decision was unwise. The items of all the subsequent scales, with the exception of the Political and Economic Conservatism (PEC) Scale, were also written so as to affirm the attitude in question.

The A-S Scale items were phrased so as to express a subtle hostility without seeming to offend the democratic values that most subjects would feel bound to support. Each item has a kind of fair-minded and reasonable veneer. It is sometimes rather difficult to find the sting. The following item is a good example: "The trouble with letting Jews into a nice neighborhood is that they gradually give it a typical Jewish atmosphere." How could it be otherwise? Surely Jews will produce a Jewish atmosphere. They will at any rate do so if one thinks of Jews as "categorically different from non-Jews." However it is just this saliency of "Jewishness" which the authors consider the beginning of anti-Semitism.

In the second place, if one thinks of "Jewishness" as a set of acquired traits which are subject to change then it is not inevitable that Jews should produce a characteristic neighborhood atmosphere. The atmosphere might chiefly depend on the occupation and education of the residents—Jewish or no. If however the ethnic category has innate ineluctable qualities then the "typical" atmosphere must always be there.

Notice next the use of the expression "letting into." One can only "let in" someone motivated to enter. If the outsider did not wish to come in he would have to be invited or urged or dragged in. How easily we assume that "letting into" is the only possible expression and yet by doing so we attribute to the ethnic category an "intrusive" impulse and that is part of the investigators' definition of an anti-Semitic frame of mind.

Finally there is hostility to this intrusive group in the clever use of the words "trouble" and "nice." Clearly the neighborhood is expected to be less "nice" if it acquires a typical Jewish atmosphere. The item, then, contains all the essentials of anti-Semitism, but they are so artfully expressed that the statement at first appears innocuous.

Here are some other items from the A-S Scale:

1. "One trouble with Jewish businessmen is that they stick together

and connive, so that a Gentile doesn't have a fair chance in competition."

2. "I can hardly imagine myself marrying a Jew."

3. "No matter how Americanized a Jew may seem to be, there is always something different and strange, something basically Jewish underneath."

The original fifty-two items of the A-S Scale were divided into two sets of twenty-six items each and the two sets were administered to the same subjects a week apart. The correlation between the scores was .92. Correlations among the subscales ranged from .74 to .94. There was ample evidence that these opinion items clustered together; a person agreeing with one of them was likely to agree with others.

The Ethnocentrism (E) Scale. We come now upon a very important fact: People who are antagonistic to Jews are likely also to be antagonistic to Negroes and to "Japs," "Okies," foreigners in general. "Of course," one says at first, but there is no logical necessity in the fact. If the reputation of an ethnic group with a particular man were dependent on that man's personal experience with members of the group it is not clear why a man who thinks ill of one minority would think ill of the others nor why a man who thinks well of one should think well of all. Because this is the case it seems likely that neither the behavior of minorities nor our acquaintance with a sample of that behavior is the critical determinant of our attitudes toward them.

Anti-Semitism most commonly appears as a single manifestation of ethnocentrism. The latter term was introduced by William Graham Sumner in his book *Folkways* (1906). Sumner defined ethnocentrism as a tendency to be rigid in the acceptance of the culturally alike and in the rejection of the culturally unlike. The emphasis in this definition is a little different from that in our own definition offered in Chapter 4 but Sumner's emphasis is the more appropriate one for the present case.

The Berkeley investigators wrote thirty-four Likert-type items for the diagnosis of ethnocentrism. Some of these were concerned with Negroes, some with such other minorities as "Japs," "Okies," Filipinos, zootsuiters, foreigners, members of small political parties, criminals, and subnormals. In some items the emphasis was not so much on the odious qualities of minorities and outsiders as on the superior qualities of one's own family and the American Way.

Here are some sample items:

1. "Negroes have their rights, but it is best to keep them in their own districts and schools and to prevent too much contact with whites."
2. "Zootsuiters prove that when people of their type have too much money and freedom, they just take advantage and cause trouble."
3. "Certain religious sects who refuse to salute the flag should be forced to conform to such a patriotic action, or else be abolished."

4. "America may not be perfect, but the American Way has brought us about as close as human beings can get to a perfect society."

The correlation of one half of the items in the Ethnocentrism Scale with the other half of the items, was .91. The correlation between Ethnocentrism and the original 52-item A-S Scale was .80. These results are evidence that antagonism to the culturally unlike is a generalized sentiment.

The Political and Economic Conservatism (PEC) Scale. By the end of the nineteenth century it was widely believed in both Europe and the United States that political views and political institutions could be ranged on a continuum from the radical left to the conservative right. The conservative right has believed in self-enrichment by personal exertion and in the rightness of the social and economic inequalities that follow from such individual competition; it has been opposed to such interferences with rugged individualism as social welfare legislation, state regulation of economic activity, and to the association of working men into labor unions. More generally conservatism has championed the *status quo*, religion and tradition over science and humanitarianism. The radical left has chiefly stood for economic and social equality, for full suffrage, civil liberties, labor unions, welfare legislation, change and science. Fascism, which emerged in the 1930's in Germany and Italy, was interpreted by Marxists and most intellectuals as a movement of extreme right conservatism and the Berkeley researchers made this same interpretation. German fascism was notably ethnocentric and anti-Semitic. The Berkeley group expected to find that its anti-Semitic and ethnocentric subjects would have the political and economic values of the American conservative right wing.

The Berkeley group took the definitive component of conservatism to be an attachment to "things as they are," a resistance to social change. Primary values for the American conservative seemed to include practicality, ambition, and financial success. "Most people get pretty much what they deserve," the conservative holds. The rich have earned their wealth and the poor their poverty. The radical or liberal sees poverty as a symptom of disorder in the political and economic system. He favors economic planning, strong labor unions, welfare legislation.

Here are some items written for the Political and Economic Conservatism (PEC) Scale:

1. "A child should learn early in life the value of a dollar and the importance of ambition, efficiency, and determination."
2. "The best way to solve social problems is to stick close to the middle of the road, to move slowly, and to avoid extremes."
3. "The only way to provide adequate medical care for the entire population is through some program of socialized medicine."

4. "In general, full economic security is harmful; most men wouldn't work if they didn't need the money for eating and living." Item three asserts a liberal opinion and reactions of *disagreement* with this item increase the PEC score. This scale, unlike the A-S and E scales includes items affirming both sides of the issues with which it is concerned.

The split-half reliabilities of the PEC scales are lower than the reliabilities of the A-S and the E scales; for PEC the average $r = .73$, while for A-S and E the correlations are between .8 and .9. This shows that the components of conservatism identified in this research cluster with some consistency but the consistency is less than in the case of the components of anti-Semitism or ethnocentrism.

Finally the scores of the PEC Scale did not correlate as highly with scores on the A-S Scale and the E Scale as did the scores on the latter two scales with one another. The mean correlation for PEC with E is .57 and for PEC with A-S only .43. The range of correlations is very great, from .14 to .86. It is noteworthy that, of the thirty or so correlations calculated for different groups, none was negative. In short, neither ethnocentrism nor anti-Semitism ever showed a tendency to go with leftist liberal views; the conservative was always more ethnocentric and anti-Semitic but the association was not strong.

Conservatism and radicalism or liberalism do not, in these data, appear to be perfectly consistent ideologies. As an ideological continuum the conservative-liberal dimension is not closely aligned with either ethnocentrism or anti-Semitism but is in some degree aligned with them. Antagonism to minorities is more likely to be combined with conservative political views than with liberal views but the latter combination is also common and so, too, is a combination of conservatism with little antagonism to minorities.

The Implicit Antidemocratic Trends or Potentiality for Fascism (F) Scale. The authors of the F Scale call it by both of the titles listed above. So far as one can determine they never refer to the F Scale as the Authoritarianism Scale in their book *The Authoritarian Personality*. However, since the F Scale is supposed to identify the kind of personality the book is talking about, it is reasonable to suppose that the scale could also be correctly called the Authoritarianism Scale. At any rate it has been so called in many subsequent research reports (Christie, 1954).

The Berkeley researchers do not explain the variation in their names for the scale and the personality type. It is likely that the preference for one name over the others on any given occasion was dictated by the appropriateness of the connotations of each term to the authors' thinking as of that date. In the book as a whole the authors probably intend the several terms to be understood as equivalents. In one important respect, however, they are not equivalent. Fascism implies conservative right-wing views

while "antidemocratic" and "authoritarian" do not. Eventually, as we shall see, it became a matter of serious dispute whether the F Scale assesses only fascism (authoritarian of the right) or assesses authoritarianism in general (right or left).

With the F Scale the Berkeley researchers believed that they were moving to the level of personality. While the scale items are statements of opinion and have the same form as items on the A-S, E, and PEC scales they do not make assertions about minority groups or about political and economic issues. The scale is intended to measure implicit authoritarian or antidemocratic trends in a personality, trends rendering the personality susceptible to explicit Fascist propaganda.

The thirty-eight items of the initial form of the F Scale are a greatly varied lot. In part they were suggested by fascist writings and by the speeches of anti-Semitic agitators. In part they were suggested by persistent themes in the interview protocols of ethnocentric subjects and in their TAT stories. For these data, which we have not yet described, had been collected and studied before the F Scale was written. Indeed the F Scale represents an effort to capture in a questionnaire the insights of the clinical studies.

The items are subclassified under nine general terms. These terms are supposed to constitute the antidemocratic or potentially fascistic syndrome. *Syndrome* is a word used in medicine for a collection of concurrent symptoms of a disease. The nine antidemocratic symptoms are not bound together by logic. If it turns out that they hang together empirically, that persons who have one tend to have all, then the explanation of this fact must be found in the disease process. In the present case that process is conceived as a system of personality dynamics.

Here now are the nine characteristics briefly defined and with two items to illustrate each one.

a. *Conventionalism.* A rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values.

1. "Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn."
2. "The businessman and the manufacturer are much more important to society than the artist and the professor."

b. *Authoritarian Submission.* A submissive, uncritical attitude toward idealized moral authorities of the ingroup.

1. "Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down."
2. "Science has its place, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind."

c. *Authoritarian Aggression*. A tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values.

1. "Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse."
2. "If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off."

d. *Anti-Intracception*. An opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tender-minded.

1. "When a person has a problem or worry, it is best for him not to think about it, but to keep busy with more cheerful things."
2. "Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should remain personal and private."

e. *Superstition and Stereotypy*. The belief in mystical determinants of the individual's fate, the disposition to think in rigid categories.

1. "Some day it will probably be shown that astrology can explain a lot of things."
2. "Some people are born with an urge to jump from high places."

f. *Power and "Toughness"*. A preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power figures; overemphasis upon the conventionalized attributes of the ego; exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness.

1. "People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong."
2. "Most people don't realize how much our lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret places."

g. *Destructiveness and Cynicism*. A generalized hostility, vilification of the human.

1. "Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict."
2. "Familiarity breeds contempt."

h. *Projectivity*. The disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the projection outwards of unconscious emotional impulses.

1. "Wars and social troubles may someday be ended by an earthquake or flood that will destroy the whole world."
2. "Nowadays when so many different kinds of people move around and mix together so much, a person has to protect himself especially carefully against catching an infection or disease from them."

i. *Sex*. Exaggerated concern with sexual "goings-on."

1. "The wild sex life of the old Greeks and Romans was tame compared to some of the goings-on in this country, even in places where people might least expect it."

2. "Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be severely punished."

Do you know him—the Authoritarian, the Antidemocrat, the Pre-Fascist? It seems to me that I do. Item after item in the F Scale is something I have heard or very like something I have heard. Furthermore the people I know who have made one of these statements have usually gone on to make others of them. I am less confident of the reality of the nine subscales. The characteristics naming them are not clearly defined and it is not obvious to me that items within a scale cluster together more tightly than do items across subscales. What did the authors find?

The items as a whole had something in common. There was for the first version of the scale a split-half reliability of .74 and, for the final version, that reliability averaged .90. For the F Scale we have more information about internal consistency than for the A-S, E, and PEC scales. For the final version, responses to each item were correlated with responses to each other item. The average of these correlations was .13 and the range was from $-.05$ to $.44$. In addition, scores on each single item were correlated with total scores for the remaining items and the mean of these correlations was .33. At a later date the authors of the F Scale made their original data available to Melvin (1955) who did a factor analysis of it and found a very strong general factor running through all items (cited by Eysenck, 1954, p. 152). The Berkeley authors had found a superficially heterogeneous set of opinions that had, as a total set, some kind of psychological unity. However the items within a subscale were not more closely correlated with one another than they were with numerous items outside the subscale. The nine symptoms or characteristics (e.g., "conventionalism," "projectivity,") were not, in short, shown to be psychologically real.

With the F Scale the Berkeley group hoped to identify a personality system that was potentially fascistic and so they expected F Scale scores to correlate with the explicit tenets of fascism expressed in the A-S, E, and PEC scales. This proved to be the case. For the first form of the scale the mean correlation with A-S was .53, with E it was .65, and with PEC, .54. The F Scale was revised several times by dropping items that did not correlate with total scores or that were not predictive of A-S and E scores. For the final version of the scale the mean correlation with an E Scale that included anti-Semitic items was .75; the correlation with PEC was only .57.

It was ethnocentrism, anti-Semitism, and potentiality for fascism that were most strongly interrelated. These attitudes and personality characteristics tended to be associated with conservatism in political and economic matters but not so strongly as they were associated with one

another. This pattern suggests that there may have been quite a few ethnocentric and antidemocratic subjects who were leftist liberal in the political and economic sphere. That is a fact to remember because it is related to later developments.

COVARIATION OF INTERVIEW AND PROJECTIVE DATA

We are crossing the methodological line from fixed-alternative questionnaires to free-response interviews and projectives. It has been said that this is a line similar to that between multiple-choice examinations and essay examinations. Many teachers believe that the best way to sample a student's knowledge is to combine the two kinds of examination. Multiple-choice tests, and also questionnaire items, present a certain problem of communication: the student or subject must try to make out what the teacher or researcher means by the item. The greater burden of decoding is on the one who answers. Essay examinations, and also interview protocols and projective data, present the complementary problem of communication. The respondent is free to formulate his own answers, but the inquirer must try to figure out what he means by them. The greater burden of decoding is on the one who asks. The Berkeley investigators, like some teachers, seem to have believed that the best hope of discovering the truth lay in a combination of the two methods.

Teachers do not ordinarily make a reliability check on their evaluations of essays. When this has been done the results have sometimes revealed a discreditable degree of unreliability. The interpreter of interview and projective protocols usually has a more delicate job to do than the grader of essays and so it behooves him to be more concerned about reliability. In the present research we do not have the simple problem of sorting total productions into categories comparable to the letter-grade categories. Rather we have the problem of searching total productions for various kinds of content, the problem of coding content so as to make it quantifiable. Consequently, reliability of scoring is an important consideration.

Interview Collection and Coding. The interview study dealt only with persons whose questionnaire responses identified them as ideologically extreme. There were eighty interviewees, of whom about half had placed in the highest quartile (25%) of the E Scale distribution and about half in the lowest quartile. Forty subjects were men and forty were women. You may remember that most subjects in the survey studies were recruited through some formal group. The researchers now wanted to select out particular interviewees but did not want to alarm them by saying that they had been picked because of the extremity of their attitudes. Consequently interviewees were told that they had been selected on the basis of

age and regional origin. They were identified by birthdate only, in order to preserve anonymity.

High scorers are supposed to be anti-intrceptive and one item they are likely to have endorsed is: "Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should remain personal and private." Such subjects might, therefore, have been reluctant to submit to an intensive interview lasting one-and-a-half to three hours. Largely as an inducement to such interviewees the researchers offered a three-dollar fee; they report that this fee was helpful in obtaining their subjects.

The nature of the interview schedule used in this research must be appreciated if we are to make a sound evaluation of the results. There were six general areas to be covered: 1) Vocation; 2) Income; 3) Religion; 4) Clinical Data; 5) Politics; 6) Minorities and Race. There were subtopics in each area. Clinical data, for example, included: 4a) Family Background: Sociological Aspects; 4b) Family Figures: Personal Aspects; 4c) Childhood; 4d) Sex; 4e) Social Relationships; and 4f) School.

Within each subtopic the interviewer was to have in mind a set of critical underlying questions which were to be answerable from the talk of the interviewee. In the case of subtopic 4b (Family Figures: Personal Aspects) the underlying questions concerned the "Subject's Conception of Parent Figures" and the "Pattern of Power Relations between Father and Mother." These underlying questions were not to be asked in any direct form. One does not ask: "What was the power relation between your father and mother?" The interviewer's task was, instead, to ask more specific questions couched in familiar language and to continue asking such questions until he judged that material had been obtained which would enable a coder of the protocol to answer the underlying question. It was not for the interviewer himself to answer the underlying question. His job was simply to have those questions in mind and to keep asking about particulars until it seemed to him that there was material which would make it possible to answer the underlying questions.

For the particular direct questions to be used in probing for relevant material there was no required set and no required sequence but only a list of suggestions. For example, the interview schedule recommends the following inquiries as means of learning about the "Pattern of Power Relations between Father and Mother:"

How did your parents get along together?

In what ways were your parents most alike?

In what ways were they different from each other?

Who made the decisions usually? (Get specific information e.g., finances, recreation, discipline of children, residence, etc.)

Disagreements arise in every family from time to time; what bones of contention did your parents sometimes have? [Adorno, et al., 1950, p. 314]

Finally, interviewers were instructed to make a close study, in advance of the interview, of all the questionnaire responses of the interviewee. The Berkeley investigators believed that such advance knowledge would help the interviewer to focus on critical topics. They believed that there was no danger that the results would be biased by the interviewer's knowledge of his subject since the interviewers were not scheduled to code the data but only to collect it. The coders, of course, would not know anything about the questionnaire scores of the subjects since such knowledge could affect what they would "see" in a protocol. The priming of interviewers with knowledge of the questionnaire results is an aspect of the research procedure that was to be severely criticized.

Since the interviewers were oriented to a set of underlying questions it would be reasonable to anticipate that the coding of the data would simply have been a matter of sorting the answers to each underlying question into a set of mutually exclusive categories. Such is not the case. Consider, for example, the underlying question: "Pattern of Power Relations between Father and Mother." One might have guessed that there would be three response categories such as Father Dominant, Mother Dominant, and Parental Equality. Each subject would then be counted as having produced one of these three alternatives. This is not the way the investigators conceived of their questions and not the way they handled their data. The so-called "questions" are actually very general areas of inquiry and the inquiries produced complex multi-dimensional data which the authors coded in any way that promised to distinguish prejudiced subjects from unprejudiced subjects.

There were about ninety coding categories and the categories were somewhat different for men than for women. Before they made up the scoring manual the investigators read through most of the interviews. From this preliminary examination they formed impressions as to the differences between the high-prejudice subjects and the low-prejudice subjects. These impressions, together with a developing theory of the causes of prejudice, guided the formulation of coding categories and the writing of the Scoring Manual. The categories were conceived as pairs and the manual identified one member of each pair as a presumed High category and the other as presumed Low. A High category was one that was expected to be scored for high-prejudice subjects and a Low category for low-prejudice subjects. The third alternative in each case was a Neutral category and it was to be scored whenever there was not enough relevant material to justify either the High or the Low or where the material was too conflicting for either High or Low to be scored. Each pair of categories was supposed to be rated independently of all the others but subsequent to a study of the complete interview protocol.

Some of the pairs of categories are clearly related to particular under-

lying questions. In connection with "Power Relations between Father and Mother" there is the pair: "Denial of parental conflict" vs. "Open and objective verbalization of such conflict." The first member is the High category, the category expected to be associated with high prejudice, and the second member is the Low category. Also relevant to the same underlying question would be the pair of categories: "Father domination" (High) vs. "Mother orientation" (Low). These two pairs of categories are responsive to the same single underlying question but they do not function as four mutually exclusive alternative answers. They are rather two dichotomized dimensions laid across interview material relevant to parental power. Each protocol is scored for both dimensions. For some of the underlying questions (e.g., "Subject's Conception of Parent Figures") the coded dimensions of response are more numerous.

Some coding categories are not responsive to any particular underlying question. For example, subjects were given scores on various aspects of character structure. Did a subject manifest "counter-cathetic rejection of 'erotic' orality" or "positive expressions of 'erotic' orality?" (The terminology is psychoanalytic.) Did he have an "externalized superego" or an "internalized superego," a "weak ego" or a "strong or moderately strong ego?" These categories would have had to be coded as impressions from the total protocol. They illustrate the fact that many categories were not responsive to any particular underlying question and also will serve, I think, to show that some categories were both subtle and elaborately interpretive. Reliability in coding such categories would be difficult to achieve. All references to minority groups were deleted from the interviews and the raters did not see the questionnaires of the subjects. This means they did "blind" coding, coding without knowledge of a subject's position on the prejudice dimension. There were two coders, one male and one female. Both had training in psychology and both had participated in discussions devoted to the development of the coding scheme.

The information given on rating reliability is very sketchy. The two raters coded different interviews, each did approximately equal numbers of male and female subjects and of high and low prejudice subjects. The interview results for any given subject are, therefore, based on a single coding. Had the two coders both done all the interviews would they have produced closely similar results? To find this out the authors picked nine interviews to be coded by both raters. There was reason to believe that two of these interviews were exceptionally difficult to code. Unfortunately we are not told how well the raters agreed on each particular pair of categories in each interview. Instead the authors give, for both raters, the percentage of High categories scored in each total interview. For the most part these are closely similar.

Projective Collection and Coding. The work done with two other

clinical instruments is very much like the interview study. The instruments were Murray's Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) and a set of projective questions. For the TAT, subjects are asked to tell a story about each of a standard set of pictures. In the present instance each subject saw ten pictures, some of them from Murray's standard set and some of them photographs selected for the study because they showed members of various minority groups. There were eight projective questions. Here are two of them:

1. "We all have times when we feel below par. What moods or feelings are the most unpleasant or disturbing to you?"

2. "We all have impulses and desires which are at times hard to control but which we try to keep in check. What desires do you often have difficulty in controlling?"

With both the TAT and the Projective Questions a comparison was made between subjects from the highest quartile of the E Scale results and subjects from the lowest quartile. Both sets of data were examined in search of High-Low contrasts before the Scoring Manuals were written. The scoring categories were defined so as to capture quantitatively the differences suspected to exist. In these respects the procedures were the same as in the case of the interview study.

Both TAT stories and answers to projective questions are data that must be coded. The TAT stories were all analyzed "blind" (i.e., in ignorance of the storyteller's E score) by two coders: one a research staff member and one a graduate student with no previous experience on the study. Each story was separated from other stories told by the same subject and randomly placed among the total collection of stories. For the projective questions each individual answer was keyed, separated from the other answers of a subject, and randomly placed in the total set. There were two independent codings of all data. In both of these studies the coding was done under more demanding and more satisfactory circumstances than in the interview study. The reported percentages of agreement in coding answers to a question as High, Low, or Neutral are satisfactorily high. However, as in the case of the interview study, the authors do not tell us how well coders agreed on the particular content categories considered to be High, Low, or Neutral.

Two Special Groups of Subjects. Among the many groups of subjects who participated in the Berkeley study there were two of particular interest: 110 inmates of San Quentin Prison and 121 patients at the Langley-Porter Psychiatric Clinic. Both groups of subjects filled out the E, PEC, and F scales. The psychiatric patients were slightly but not significantly lower than the mean of all other groups tested on the E Scale. There was a tendency for neurosis to go with low scores and psychosis with moderately high scores.

The prisoners produced the highest mean scores of all groups tested on the E, PEC, and F scales. The criminal types represented in the San Quentin population were not, it seems, rebels against established authority. On the contrary, they were politically and economically conservative types, highly patriotic, and filled with hatred for submerged ethnic groups.

Twelve of the prisoners were interviewed; of these, eight scored high on the E Scale and four scored relatively low. Among the high scorers there were three subjects whom the researchers characterize as "overt fascists." These three were not actually members of any self-styled fascist party and so their high scores on all scales cannot be taken as a validation of the characterization of these scales as measures of political fascism. The three subjects were labelled fascist by the authors because they explicitly endorsed the use of force to suppress minorities and to protect business against labor unions. They dispensed with the pseudo-democratic façade that was important to most prejudiced subjects.

The criminal interviews were not coded or treated quantitatively but they are quoted at length in *The Authoritarian Personality* to establish the authors' position that criminal authoritarianism had the same fundamental personality dynamics as did the authoritarianism that was within the law. Some of the quotations, especially those from the three prisoners who were labelled fascistic, are hair-raising. They suggest that we could find, in this country, willing recruits for a Gestapo.

Concerning Negroes: "They're very closely linked with the jungle. They're built for it." Concerning Jews: "Most all of them Jews talk about sex mostly, or beatin' a guy out of his money." (This latter is from a man who had been arrested for sexually molesting his own children.) Concerning labor unions: "Take away their charters. . . . Abolish them." Concerning parents: ". . . always tried to teach me the right thing; being in prison is not my folks' fault." Concerning the determinants of human behavior: "If I ever did anything wrong, it was the Latin in me." And so on.

For the patients at the Langley-Porter Clinic the study centered on their first psychiatric interview—an interview concerned chiefly with the patient's description of his problems. These interviews were held by members of the regular clinic staff who had no knowledge of the research project and no expectation that the interviews would be studied by outsiders. This is an important fact because, as we shall later see, it exempts the present interview study from a very serious criticism that must be made of the major interview study.

The initial interviews for twenty-eight subjects who scored high on the E Scale and thirty-one who scored low were coded for seven characteristics. Before the coding categories were defined all of the interviews

were examined for content that seemed to distinguish prejudiced subjects from unprejudiced subjects. This again is an important fact because, as we shall see, it means that the study of the patient interviews was subject to one serious criticism that must also be made of all the other studies involving content analysis.

Most of the coding categories were similar to categories used in other parts of the study. For example, prejudiced subjects were expected to be anti-intraceptive and extrapunitive. Several categories adapt traits of ordinary authoritarians to the special case of psychiatric patients. Prejudiced subjects were expected chiefly to complain of somatic or physical ailments such as dizziness, tremor, fast heartbeat, and the like, while unprejudiced subjects were expected to complain of such psychological ailments as anxiety, conflict, and depression. In addition, prejudiced subjects were expected to blame their troubles on particular unlucky external events—an illness, a divorce, a death. Unprejudiced subjects would be more likely to see their symptoms as having been present in milder form for years, possibly since childhood.

All of the interviews were coded by two judges who were thoroughly familiar with the hypotheses and findings of the total research. In addition, however, there were seven control raters who were completely unacquainted with the research as a whole. Each control rater coded all interviews for *just one variable*. In the content analyses of the major interview study each rater coded all variables and that means that knowledge of one could easily have biased the coding of another. The study of psychiatric interviews was free of this flaw.

Coding reliabilities were calculated for the two coders who did all the interviews and also for one of these coders and all the control coders. We are given the percentages of coding agreement on *each coding category*, which is the proper report to make on reliability for data of this sort, a report that was not made for the other content analyses. The average percentage agreement between the main rater and the seven control raters was 77 per cent.

Results. In all three sets of clinical data, in the interview protocols, the TAT stories, and the answers to the projective questions, the investigators found numerous statistically significant differences between prejudiced subjects and unprejudiced subjects. Some of the differences occur in content categories that are already familiar to us from the F Scale. "Anti-Intraceptive" is a content category for the analysis of interview protocols as well as a rubric under which certain F Scale items were classified. In both sets of data it is the prejudiced subjects who are anti-intraceptive. Some of the distinctive content categories are very closely related to F Scale rubrics; the Pseudo- or Anti-Scientific category for interview analysis is very like the Superstition and Stereotypy of the F Scale. Again and again quotations from the subjects' freely composed responses echo

the items of the F Scale. In considerable degree, then, the projective data confirm the covariation of implicit antidemocratic trends with prejudice which was demonstrated by the questionnaire data.

Analysis of the projective data also added many new items of behavior to the circle of covariation. Prejudiced subjects in interviews showed a tendency to separate sex and affection while unprejudiced subjects were likely to fuse the two. In the TAT stories of prejudiced subjects there was more primitive, impulsive aggression; the heroes of their stories were more often dependent on the demands and regulations of authority. In response to a projective question about the "worst crimes a person could commit" prejudiced subjects were likely to list crimes against the physical person while unprejudiced subjects were likely to list crimes against the personality—psychological cruelties and violations of trust.

All of these data are verbal, all of them roughly contemporaneous. They add up to a list, a very long one, of correlated differences. I have not the patience to write them all down and you would not find it interesting to read or possible to remember. But when the authors interpret the list it becomes a pattern, in more than one dimension, and the pattern is somewhat lifelike.

The transformation from list to personality is accomplished in the following way. Some of the things subjects said are assumed to have historical truth, to be realistic accounts of past events and so a genetic dimension is added. Some of the things subjects said are understood literally, others are interpreted as revelations of unconscious wishes and so a dimension of psychological "depth" is added. Some of the things subjects said are set alongside other things with which they are in conflict and so dynamic forces are added. The construction as a whole is guided by a general blueprint of human personality, the blueprint is psychoanalytic theory.

The widening circle of covariation has become too wide to keep in view and so we will stop describing uninterpreted data. The results of the studies of projective material are more interesting and memorable as parts of the intellectual construction called the authoritarian personality than as unpatterned fragments. The citation of data will be highly selective, chiefly from the interviews, but copious enough, I hope, so that you can judge the adequacy of the evidence.

Construction of the Personality

We can begin with findings which suggest that the prejudiced person has a more consistently favorable impression of himself than does the unprejudiced person. The most directly relevant contrast in the coding categories is: "Self-glorification" as opposed to "Objective self-appraisal."

Prejudiced persons say such things as: "I have always tried to live according to His Ten Commandments" or "Think one of my best assets is my poise" or "I've always had a happy disposition, and I've always been honest with my family." From unprejudiced subjects come such appraisals as: "I'm rather shy, don't like competition" or "I don't mean I am in love with my mother, but I have a dependency complex . . . married a woman older than myself."

There are other interview categories which contribute to our impression that the prejudiced person has an exceptionally good opinion of himself. In describing their sexual experiences, for example, prejudiced men boast of their conquests and represent themselves as ideals of masculinity while women speak of having "scads of boys friends." By contrast, an unprejudiced woman says: "I am avoided by the male sex perhaps because I am heavy" and a man reports that he has "always been rather inhibited about sex."

In addition to having a good opinion of themselves prejudiced persons have a good opinion of their parents. The most directly relevant interview categories are: "Conventional idealization of parents" vs. "Objective appraisal." Prejudiced subjects say of their fathers: "He is very sincere and very well liked by his friends and employees" and "He is exceptionally good looking, dresses well, has gray hair" and "I've always been very proud to be his son." Of their mothers they say: "Most terrific person in the world to me" and "She's friendly with everybody." The prejudiced person does not have a father and a mother for parents; he has "Father's Day" and "Mother's Day."

Unprejudiced subjects said of their fathers: "Father tries to be rational but is not always so" and "I think he wanted a boy, so he paid little attention to me." Of their mothers they say: "She is practical and sensible, but she gets too much interested in fads" and "She gives me too much advice."

Very generally, prejudiced subjects do not describe themselves or their parents as fearful or dependent or slothful or aggressive against properly constituted authority or as having any of the traits of the other sex. Unprejudiced subjects are more likely to ascribe such faults and shortcomings to themselves and their parents. Here then are some new correlates of prejudice. We could stop here, with the simple listing, but instead we will attempt to figure out what the difference means, how it comes about.

One ought, in the first place, to consider the possibility that the two kinds of self and of parental appraisal are the simple truth. Prejudiced people and their parents may, in fact, be superior to the unprejudiced. As you might guess this was not the view of the Berkeley researchers. Their interpretation is actually revealed in the labelling of the categories: "Self-glorification" vs. "Objective appraisal" and "Conventional idealization of

parents" against "Objective appraisal." These titles make it clear that the reports of unprejudiced subjects are presumed to be accurate or truthful ("objective") whereas the reports of prejudiced subjects are presumed to be inaccurate ("idealized" or "glorified"). What ground have they for treating the prejudiced as liars and the unprejudiced as truth-tellers? Is this a prejudice of their own, a device to evade the unpalatable conclusion that prejudiced people are generally pleasanter people than the unprejudiced?

One might doubt the accuracy of the prejudiced subjects' glowing appraisal of himself and his parents on the ground of manifest improbability. People are simply not that good. Characters are always flawed by fearfulness or dependency or antagonism. People do not greatly differ in the degree to which they possess faults and shortcomings but only in their awareness of such unwelcome traits. Where character flaws are not explicitly confessed it must be because the subject does not want to be aware of them.

Ambivalent feelings are mixed feelings, positive and negative sentiments concentrated on the same object. As Chapter 11 argues and as Freud always assumed, it is human nature to abhor ambivalence. Behind this abhorrence, I suspect, is the fact that ambivalence must tend to paralyze action. If one likes an object or person the thing to do is to approach and if one dislikes to retreat. Ambivalence must activate both tendencies but it is impossible to act on both.

While human beings do not welcome ambivalence there are ways of coping with it. One can differentiate the object for example, oneself or one's parents—into parts, some of them good and some bad. A mother can be practical and sensible but inclined to give too much advice; a father can be affectionate but not handsome or not practical. Ambivalence is resolved by cognitive complication, by making distinctions among the manifestations of an object, the traits of a person, or the members of a minority. The unprejudiced subject seems to cope with inevitable ambivalence by consciously recognizing both the good and bad parts.

On the presumption that some ambivalence of feeling for oneself and one's parents is inevitable it would seem that the prejudiced person is unable to cope with it by complicating his conceptions. He maintains the unity of the object of feeling and handles ambivalence by denying (perhaps repressing) one part of his feelings. Since it is important to think well of oneself and one's parents it is the negative feelings, the unfavorable judgments, that are denied. This argument holds that the person who reports only favorable judgments of himself and his parents is motivated to deny contrary judgments and the basis for that interpretation is the assumption that in any human life there must be grounds for such judgments. The prejudiced person keeps his consciousness clear and unambivalent by denying or repressing what is unwelcome.

This is not the whole story. Prejudiced subjects do not always give perfectly ideal portraits. There are in the interviews with prejudiced subjects some negative self-appraisals. "I have let myself slip, let my carnal self get away from me. . . ." "Except for my industriousness. That just doesn't exist." "I guess I just got that from the other side of the family." Concerning parents, too, there were some unfavorable remarks. "She [mother] was very nervous. Irritable only when overdoing." "He [father] has a hot temper." In the TAT stories and in the answers to projective questions there was additional evidence that many prejudiced subjects were somewhat ambivalent about themselves and their parents.

So then we have direct evidence that prejudiced subjects hold some unfavorable feelings and we are not, after all, forced to posit the existence of such feelings on the grounds of simple probability. This is fine, but the drawback is that we appear to have lost the distinction we started with since both kinds of subjects are manifestly ambivalent. This is not the view of the California researchers. They and their coders judged that the negative feelings expressed by prejudiced subjects could be seen to have a quite different psychological status from the negative feelings of unprejudiced subjects. The criticisms of self and parents voiced by the prejudiced were, to use a psychoanalytic term, "ego-alien." The criticisms were not being consciously faced as such. They were foreign particles, excrescences, impositions from without.

How on earth could one tell whether a criticism is ego-alien? By any of several signs. The prejudiced subject said: "I have let my carnal self get away from me." The carnality is distinguishable from himself, it is not really he. Another subject said that his lack of industriousness was inherited from one side of his family. It was imposed on him, not something for which he himself could be held to account. In speaking of their parents prejudiced subjects frequently began with generalized glowing praise and then seemed to let slip some specific criticism. Such criticisms were often promptly retracted: "He forced some decisions on me" but "He allowed me to do as I pleased; arguments were about things he didn't want me to have" but "He never denied me anything I needed." There is an impression that the criticism pops out against the subject's intention and is then denied or blamed on an external cause or isolated from the essential self or parent.

In the TAT stories as well as the interview protocols it is said to be possible to recognize ego-alien negative feelings. What are the signs? One prejudiced subject told no stories in which the hero was aggressive against either a father or any sort of "father-figure." Since the storyteller is presumed to identify himself with the hero we might say that there was no consciously accepted aggression of this kind. However, aggression of this kind was exhibited by characters in the story whom the storyteller took

pains to reject. The heroes identified themselves with authority but figures from whom the subjects dissociated themselves attacked authority. It is this kind of pattern that is taken to be evidence of ego-alien aggression.

Both prejudiced and unprejudiced subjects seem to have aggressive feelings about themselves and their parents but in the former subjects these feelings are ego-alien which means that they are repressed, denied, or isolated while in the latter subjects these feelings are integrated into objective conceptions. What difference does it make whether a feeling is ego-alien or integrated? Are there differential consequences? The first thing to note is that the subjects for whom negative feelings are ego-alien are the prejudiced subjects, the subjects who attribute undesirable characteristics to outgroups. The sins and weaknesses we miss in their self-descriptions and in their descriptions of their parents turn up in what they say about minority groups.

From the minorities section of the interviews come these assertions. "Jewish people are more *obsequious*." "Since the Negro has that feeling that he isn't up to par, he's always trying to show off. . . . Even though he can't afford it, he will buy an expensive car just to make a show." "The Jew is always crying." "They [Jews] suffer from every lust." "They [Negroes] all carry knives; if you do something they don't like, they will get even with you, they will slice you up." "But they [Jews] are so clanish and aggressive and loud that sometimes I can't stand them."

Let me summarize the case for the prosecution of authoritarians: Certain characteristics that are undesirable are not accepted as characteristic of the subject and his parents. However, there is reason to believe that these characteristics exist in the subject and his parents, leading a kind of covert, submerged life. Finally, these characteristics are confidently attributed to others, in this case to minority groups. This is exactly the pattern of evidence that Freud called projection. Something present in oneself but unwelcome, is projected outward. When we add that the unwelcome "somethings" are chiefly sex and aggression, the important drives in Freudian theory, then projection does indeed seem to be the word for it.

If you are a psychological functionalist it is not enough to label prejudice as projection. One must ask what is projection for? What is its utility for the prejudiced person? One answer is suggested by certain quotations from the interviews. A man who bought a fur coat for his mother from a Jewish salesman took advantage of the fact that the salesman misread the price tag and so quoted a price one hundred dollars below that on the tag. "That was a case where I out-Jewed a Jew." "I am not particularly sorry because of what the Germans did to the Jews. I feel the Jews would do the same type of thing to me." Finally, "I think the time will come when we will have to kill the bastards." The prejudiced person has aggressive impulses but he dare not direct them at members.

of the in-group. He can direct aggression against minorities if he believes the minorities are themselves aggressive and so deserve to be attacked.

Projection seems also to have a functional role in the southern white man's sexual use of Negro women. If one can believe that Negro women are inherently sensual and promiscuous, then one can believe that they seduce a man against his better impulses. On the other hand, if anything happens between a white woman and a Negro it must be rape since the woman could not desire the Negro while he is certain to desire her. As Chapter 14 shows, Negro men have often been lynched for rape when there was strong reason to believe that a white woman had acted provocatively.

By projecting his own unacceptable impulses to sex and aggression the prejudiced man is able to enjoy some direct expression of these impulses. The direct expression is justified by the supposed sexual and aggressive nature of his out-group targets. Since the beliefs which support the prejudiced man's actions are not the true causes of his actions they may be considered "rationalizations" as well as projections. From a set of static correlates the authors have inferred a dynamic sequence which is put in psychoanalytic terms. Repression of impulses leads to projection which functions as rationalization for an expression.

Why is it that some people are particularly bent on maintaining an idealized image of themselves and of those close to themselves? The evidence suggesting an answer is distributed across many categories coded from the interviews. It goes like this.

The prejudiced subject is exceptionally concerned with status and success and rather little concerned with solidarity and intimacy. He puts friendship, love, and marriage in the service of status-seeking. Anyone with whom he might become intimate or even acquainted is evaluated in terms of status points. The prejudiced man always asks: "What can he do for me?" Prejudiced men sometimes expressed a wish to marry a wealthy woman and usually said they wanted a wife who could help a man advance himself; a woman who would do a man credit. Since a woman's socio-economic status is largely derived from her husband, prejudiced women are more intent than are men on assessing the status potential of a possible spouse. "I'd like to marry someone, for instance, who is going into a profession—maybe a doctor." Speaking of a former boyfriend, a prejudiced woman said: "very wealthy family but he didn't have the drive and ambition that I want."

In speaking of the qualities they would hope to find in a spouse, unprejudiced subjects often mentioned beauty, sensuality, shared aspirations. They used the language of romantic love rather than the language of status calculation. Friends were not chosen because of their positions but

because of their personal qualities. Desires for solidarity, intimacy, and love were strong in the unprejudiced.

The status and success that so much concern the prejudiced subject are conceived in a very external way. He speaks of money and material acquisitions and social esteem and power. "Every man has a certain ego that he has to satisfy. You like to be on top. If you're anybody at all, you don't like to be on the bottom." Another man said. "I never had any relations with anyone that didn't have money connected with it." Contrast the unprejudiced subjects: "Money has never meant much to me. . . . Maybe it is stupid and unrealistic. But it is the work itself that gives me satisfaction." And from another unprejudiced subject: "I like to work with young people . . . satisfaction of helping someone. . . . It doesn't pay financially, but . . . you are happier . . . makes good friends. . . ."

What is it that causes the prejudiced person to be so much concerned with status and success? The answer seems to be in the interview categories: "Family status-concerned" vs. "Family status-relaxed." Prejudiced subjects made the following observations "Well, they [parents] didn't want me to run with some kind of people—slummy women—always wanted me to associate with the higher class of people." "We lived in a nice house but really couldn't afford it. It was quite an effort to get into social circles." One man's father did not want him to work as a boy because he thought "it was beneath me." An unprejudiced subject made the following remark: "My mother had and accepted a very simple way of life." Another said: "We had a sort of scorn for people who wanted too much."

It is easy to see that parents who are insecure about their own status may produce children who are bent on success. This is little more than a simple transmission of values. But what is the connection between status anxiety and prejudice? Parents who are anxious about their own status should be very concerned to see that their children are properly brought up; that they are children no one could confuse with the offspring of the lower classes. They will want little ladies and gentlemen, not dirty, brawling brats.

How does one create little ladies and gentlemen out of tiny primates? It is clearly a job for an animal trainer, someone who can "lay down the law in no uncertain terms." Status anxiety might cause parents to interpret the roles of parent and child in terms of authority and submission. Here are some things prejudiced subjects said about their parents as disciplinarians. "Well, my father was a very strict man. He wasn't religious, but strict in raising the youngsters. His word was law, and whenever he was disobeyed, there was punishment." Another man remarked: "Father had to give us one look and we knew what he meant."

The parents who were anxious about status probably set their author-

ity firmly against weakness and passivity and unresponsibility. Probably too they firmly sex-typed behavior, requiring a stereotypical unmixed masculinity from their sons and femininity from their daughters (see Chapter 4). The exercise of so much authority would be bound to engender aggression but this seems to have been put down with a firm hand. A prejudiced woman says of her father: "You always did what he said, but it was right; there was no question about it." A man said: "We did what the elders told us to." (Ever question it?) "Well, I never questioned." A man speaks of overhearing, on the street, a child "sass" his mother and adds: "If I'd have said that to my mother, I wouldn't be able to sit down."

With the psychoanalytic concept of displacement we can make the connection to prejudice. Parental discipline frustrates the child and the frustration creates aggression. This aggression cannot be directed against its legitimate target, that would be insurrection against parental authority, and so the aggression is displaced to a less dangerous target—minority groups. Jews and Negroes and "Okies" and foreigners are inviting targets for displaced aggression because of historical circumstances that have caused them to be underprivileged and to have well-established bad reputations.

We see at last why the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* have argued that the empirical clustering of beliefs that are not logically related argues for the existence of a dynamic psychological relationship. Why should people whose parents were anxious about status have an idealized image of themselves and of their parents and a very bad opinion of minorities and foreigners? It is because status anxiety produces authoritarian discipline which produces repression of faults and shortcomings and of aggression against authority. It is the fate of repressed faults and shortcomings to be projected to minorities and outsiders. It is the fate of the repressed aggression to be displaced from authority and directed against minorities and outsiders. Finally the projected faults and shortcomings rationalize the aggression. Prejudice plays an integral role in the total ideology but the role is psychological rather than logical.

Not all of the characteristics attributed to the authoritarian personality can be neatly fitted into the above construction but many can be, for example, the fact that the prejudiced person is anti-intrceptive. On the F Scale he agrees that there is too much prying into matters that ought to remain personal and private, that when one has a problem the best thing to do is not think about it and just keep busy. From the interviews it appears that he is not given to reflection or introspection. He does not strive for insight into his own psychological operations, he does not see their role in what happens to him. When things go wrong for the prejudiced person it is because of external forces. He is disposed to be "extrapunitive"—to blame others rather than himself. "She's mean and inconsiderate and doesn't give a darn about anyone else but herself."

Among the prejudiced subjects, even those who were patients at the Langley-Porter Psychiatric Clinic resisted psychological interpretations. In their initial interviews they stressed their somatic or physical symptoms—dizziness, tremor, fainting, breathlessness. As causes they favored particular external events—a death, an illness, a shock. They sometimes spoke of psychological illness as if it were a breakdown of a machine; as if some "part"—the nerves or the mind—had given way under external stress. Because the prejudiced man's psychic equilibrium is founded heavily on repression one would expect him to avoid introspection and psychological inquiries. And so anti-intrceptiveness fits in with the total construction. The unprejudiced subjects tended to construe human life much in the manner of modern psychology. A man is his own fate. Very much of what happens to him is a consequence of his character. For those of us who have become addicted to psychological inquiry there seems to be a dimension missing from the prejudiced person; he lives his life but does not examine it.

The Cognitive Style of the Authoritarian

We come now to the California researchers' independent discovery of Jaensch's typology. Among the coding categories applied to the interviews were two that are concerned with general cognitive style: Rigidity vs. Flexibility, and Intolerance of Ambiguity vs. Tolerance of Ambiguity. Prejudiced subjects were judged to be more rigid and also more intolerant of ambiguity than the unprejudiced.

By what reasoning did the authors arrive at their predictions in the sphere of cognitive style? Intolerance of ambiguity is a generalization of the prejudiced subject's intolerance of emotional ambivalence. Ambivalence exists when both love and hate are felt for the same person. The prejudiced man wants his loves and hates to be wholehearted; he idealizes himself and his parents and anathematizes out-groups. The unprejudiced person objectively appraises both, which means that he lives with a mixture of love and hate and so with uncertainties and conflicts that are not in the consciousness of the prejudiced.

Ambivalence is uncertainty of value and ambiguity is uncertainty of meaning. An ambiguous picture is one that might be either this or that; an ambiguous word is one that might signify either this or that. The prediction that prejudiced subjects will be generally intolerant of ambiguity derives from the assumption that personality manifests a unity of style. The intolerance of ambivalence which is motivated by status anxiety and the ban on aggression against authority is expected to spread into areas where it is not specifically motivated, to become a general

style, the prejudiced person is expected to manifest intolerance of ambiguity in all perception and thought.

For the interview protocols it was suggested that the subject who is tolerant of ambiguity will make much use of limiting and qualifying language forms. The subject intolerant of ambiguity would take a more absolute tone. Of course the coders were free to consult the total protocol and so may simply have coded intolerance of ambiguity where there seemed to be intolerance of ambivalence or any of the other stigmata of authoritarianism. Consequently the interview results are not good evidence that prejudiced subjects were intolerant of ambiguity.

Rigidity is a term from common parlance with a root meaning that makes reference to the physical world. To produce changes of form in a substance a degree of resistance must be overcome. When this resistance exceeds our expectations—when a joint moves stiffly or a lump of clay is not malleable—we are likely to call the substance “rigid.” Abstracting from the physical case we attribute rigidity to thought and behavior when they are exceptionally resistant to applied forces. An elderly person who cannot change his ideas with the changing times manifests rigidity; a patient in psychotherapy who does not relinquish his defenses, in spite of the therapist’s insightful interpretations of them, manifests rigidity. The prejudiced person is supposed to show rigidity in his refusal to give up ethnic stereotypes which are presumably contradicted by common experience (see Chapter 4).

The prejudiced person is also supposed to be rigid in a somewhat different but related sense. His ideas are thickly walled off, one from another. He can, for instance, believe that Jews are both clannish and intrusive, and this espousal of propositions that are particularly contradictory suggests that beliefs are rigidly partitioned from one another. It is postulated that rigidity like intolerance of ambiguity would pervade all of the cognitive processes of the prejudiced.

We are not told in *The Authoritarian Personality* what cues coders were instructed to use in rating for rigidity. It is instructive to learn that rigidity was coded whenever intolerance of ambiguity was coded and where one was not coded the other was not coded. In short, the two formal attributes were treated as equivalent. The probability is strong that both were coded whenever a protocol revealed the more obvious signs of authoritarianism. The interview results are not good evidence that prejudiced subjects showed a pervasive cognitive rigidity.

It is never made clear whether the two formal attributes, rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity, are intended to be conceptually distinct. Usually they are treated as equivalent to one another and to such other attributes as “concreteness” and “stimulus-boundness.” In the experimental problems

devised to test the idea that prejudiced subjects have a distinctive cognitive style the two concepts usually predict the same kind of style.

Else Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) tested for intolerance of ambiguity with a perceptual problem remote from the sphere of ethnic attitudes. Her subjects were prejudiced and unprejudiced children. A picture of a dog was shown and then followed by a number of pictures representing a gradual transformation of the dog into a cat. At every stage the children were asked to identify the object pictured. The prejudiced children tended to hold on for a longer time to the original interpretation about which they had been certain. They were slow to respond to changes in the picture, reluctant to see things that could not be reconciled with the original interpretation, and inclined to shy away from transitional interpretations.

One could say that the prejudiced children manifested rigidity insofar as they resisted perceptual change by adhering, in the face of contrary evidence, to a first interpretation. They may be said to have shown intolerance of ambiguity insofar as they failed to report that transitional pictures were not clearly dog or clearly cat or anything else, but rather interpretable in a number of ways. The aspects of the performance could be separated but in the report of results they are not.

Rokeach (1948) utilized for the assessment of rigidity in problem-solving a task employed by Luchins (1942) to show the powerful effects on thought of *Einstellung* or “set.” Subjects are supposed to determine how they could measure out various quantities of water using bottles of specified sizes. Each bottle can exactly measure only its full volume as no gradations are marked. The best solution is the shortest possible method. The experimenter demonstrates the solution of some such problem as this:

Given: Containers of capacities: 31, 61, and 4 quarts.

Obtain: 22 quarts.

Solution: Fill the bottle that holds 61 quarts; from it fill the 31 quart bottle; from the remainder withdraw 4 quarts twice. In short
 $61 - 31 - 4 - 4 = 22$.

The first six problems or so can all be solved by the same method which may be abstractly characterized as: Largest—Second Largest—Smallest, two times. These are the “set” problems. Subjects ordinarily see that there is a formula which handles all problems and are pleased to have found it. Beginning with the seventh problem, while the previously used formula continues to apply, a shorter solution also becomes available. For example:

Given: 49, 23, 3

Obtain: 20

Solution: $49 - 23 - 3 - 3 = 20$ or $23 - 3 = 20$.

The effect of the set is very strong and most subjects will continue to use their formula solution. With each additional problem the probability of finding the new shorter possibility increases. The formula answer is so quick and easy that subjects naturally ask themselves what the point can be in going on unless there is more to the problems than they have discovered. Wertheimer and Luchins in their use of this task were not primarily interested in individual differences of performance. For Rokeach the test became an index of generalized mental rigidity with the score being the number of problems presented before the subject found the short answer. Rokeach found that children scoring extremely high on ethnic prejudice were significantly more rigid on these problems than were children scoring low on prejudice. He also found that college students above the median on ethnocentrism were more rigid than students below the median.

Rigidity on this task means perseveration on a mode of thought in the face of information that clearly calls for a new mode. It is a little difficult to see how intolerance of ambiguity would be involved in the present case. One might contend that in order to discover improved solutions a subject must think of the problems as susceptible of a variety of solutions and this may be a kind of ambiguity.

Perhaps the clearest experimental rendering of intolerance of ambiguity is that provided by an experiment of Block and Block (1951). A subject sees a point source of light in a totally dark room that is unfamiliar to him. Although the light is actually stationary it will appear, to almost everyone, to move. This is the autokinetic phenomenon and its exact explanation is not known. If the subject is asked to estimate at intervals the amount of movement in the light he will at first give quite varied estimates. Sooner or later he will settle on a rather limited range which has been called his individual norm (see Chapter 13).

It is the "sooner or later" aspect that interested Block and Block. To vary one's estimates is to tolerate ambiguity as to the amount of movement occurring; to stabilize one's judgments is to eliminate ambiguity. Highly ethnocentric subjects stabilized their judgments on fewer trials than did subjects who were less ethnocentric. Presumably the ethnocentric finds the perceptual uncertainty disagreeable and so resolves it rapidly.

To establish the existence of distinct cognitive styles in the prejudiced and unprejudiced it would be necessary to do the following: 1) conceptualize the two styles with a clarity that would make it possible to invent multiple measures of the two; 2) demonstrate that the styles are enduring general characteristics by showing that the various measures are intercorrelated and reliable; 3) demonstrate that the styles are significantly associated with prejudice and the absence of prejudice. This program has not been accomplished for the styles called "rigid" and "intolerant of ambiguity." What we have are a few studies showing that

one or another cognitive performance has in a particular case shown a statistical relationship with prejudice. It is not clear that the various performances operationalize the same concept and it is not known that subjects who are rigid on one would be consistently rigid on all.

We can illustrate the deficiencies in the evidence with the later history of Rokeach's discovery of a relation between prejudice and waterbottle rigidity. Dee Applezweig (1954) repeated the study and did not get the same result; Coulter (1953) repeated it in England and did not get the same result. Brown (1953) made repeated unsuccessful attempts to replicate the result with hundreds of students at the University of Michigan. Brown did find that the relationship appeared when the testing atmosphere was made very competitive and that suggests that it is not rigidity in general but rigidity under stress that correlates with prejudice. The general conclusion of these studies must be, however, that it is problematical whether prejudiced people manifest waterbottle rigidity.

Critique of The Authoritarian Personality

It is probable that no work in social psychology has been given a more meticulous methodological and conceptual examination than has *The Authoritarian Personality*. There is even a follow-up volume of evaluative papers called *Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality"* (Christie & Jahoda, 1954). The definitive critique of method is the paper in that volume by Hyman and Sheatsley. We cannot review all of the criticisms that have been made but will cover vital ones.

SAMPLING AND THE ORGANIZATION OF ATTITUDES

While the authors of the Berkeley study guessed that their findings could be generalized to the population of white, non-Jewish, native-born, middle-class Americans they recognized that the sample of persons actually studied was not a representative or random sample of this population or of any other specifiable population. To mention only one restriction, the subjects were almost all members of at least one formal organization since the major method of recruiting subjects was through such organizations. It is known that people who belong to at least one formal organization are in very many respects different from people who belong to no organizations (Christie, 1954). The authors of the Berkeley study took the position that sampling considerations were not vital to their work because they were not interested in estimating the incidence of certain attitudes but rather in establishing relationships among attitudes.

Hyman and Sheatsley take issue with the notion that sampling does not matter in a study of relationships among variables: "Correlation

coefficients, just like means or percentages, fluctuate from sample to sample and may well vary in different populations." It is conceivable that persons belonging to formal organizations, and this was the kind of person studied, are more concerned with the social issues that form the content of the A-S, E, and F scales than are persons who belong to no organizations. Concern with issues may create a high degree of organization (intercorrelation) among attitudes. Perhaps the conclusion that certain attitudes cohere into what may be called an antidemocratic ideology is only true of Americans who belong to organizations.

The record of related and subsequent researches on the intercorrelation of attitudes is instructive. These intercorrelations do indeed fluctuate from one sample to another and some of the fluctuations are interesting. E. L. Horowitz (1947), for instance, has shown that the intercorrelations among different kinds of prejudice in children, increase with age and grade in school. Prothro (1952) found that the correlation between anti-Semitic and anti-Negro attitudes for a sample of 383 middle-class adults in Louisiana was only .49, which is well below usual values obtained from adults in the North. Almost all of Prothro's subjects were anti-Negro; that was the subculture norm. Not everyone who was anti-Negro was anti-Semitic; though practically everyone who was favorable to the Negroes was also favorable to the Jews. This result shows that where a prejudice is a definite norm the people subscribing to that prejudice may not be the same kinds of people as those who subscribe to it where the prejudice is not a clear norm. Many Southerners go along with the norm concerning Negroes though they are not otherwise ethnocentric. At the same time anyone strong enough to oppose the norm about Negroes seems to have an equalitarian ideology which is also manifest in his favorable attitude toward Jews.

Whereas the magnitude of the correlations among A-S, E, and F fluctuates from sample to sample there is one impressive invariance—no negative correlations seem ever to have been reported (Christie, 1954). It does seem fairly safe therefore to conclude that A-S, E, and F were organized together for middle-class Americans in the 1940's and 1950's. The Berkeley researchers certainly were not justified in generalizing their conclusions as widely as they did, but they seem to have been lucky. They hit on a finding that is as highly reliable and highly general as they, on insufficient evidence, thought it was.

ACQUIESCENCE RESPONSE SET

The questionnaire items of the A-S, E, and F scales are all worded in such a way that agreement with the items represents, respectively, anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, or potential fascism. The authors were aware

that it is generally better practice in opinion-attitude scales to include both positive and negative items. In connection with the construction of the A-S Scale the authors set forth the considerations that persuaded them to write all the items of each scale as authoritarian assertions (Adorno, et al., 1950, p. 59). It is now clear that they made a mistake.

In a 1946 publication Cronbach discussed the problem of response sets in paper and pencil tests; for example, a subject might consistently tend to agree with assertions—regardless of their content. If all the items in a scale assert in the same direction a high score might be as much a manifestation of this sort of acquiescence response set as of agreement with the particular content of the assertions. Cohn (1953) was one of the first to propose that the F Scale was in part a measure of such acquiescent tendencies. He found a correlation of +.41 between agreement with a mixed lot of questions from a personality inventory (the MMPI) and a version of the F Scale. The storm really broke in 1955 when Bass composed reversed versions of the F Scale items and administered both the original scale and the reversed scale to the same subjects. If authoritarian content were the only determinant of responses then agreement with an F Scale item ought always to be associated with disagreement with that item's reversal. The resulting correlation between scores on the F Scale and the reverse scale should approximate -1.00 . The obtained correlation was only $-.20$ and so it was evident that the degree of authoritarianism manifested on the F Scale was not usually matched by the degree of authoritarianism manifested on the reversed scale. Further analyses showed that some subjects consistently acquiesced with both authoritarian assertions and their reversals whereas some subjects consistently disagreed with both kinds of assertions. The acquiescent subject, had he been given the F Scale alone, would have appeared to be authoritarian and the disagreeing subject would have appeared to be equalitarian. Indeed one treatment of his data (shown by Messick and Jackson in 1957 to be unwarranted) suggested to Bass that acquiescence was more important than authoritarianism as a determinant of F Scale scores.

The discovery of the role of acquiescence in the F Scale made uncertain the interpretation of many studies showing consistent correlations between F scores and scores on other paper and pencil tests. Many of these other tests were also written so that most items asserted in a single direction and so these tests like the F Scale were measures of acquiescence. Consequently many results that had been interpreted as manifestations of the generality of authoritarianism now appeared to be interpretable as manifestations of the generality of acquiescence. This unsettling possibility applied to the original correlations among A-S, E, and F scores since all of these scales were unbalanced. An assortment of researches confirmed the importance of acquiescence as a determinant of

F scores though, in general, it did not appear to be more important than authoritarianism as Bass had thought. In 1958 Christie and his associates added some depth to the discussion and also some superior data.

What does it mean to "reverse" an F Scale item? Consider the item: "Some people are born with an urge to jump from high places." One investigator constructed as its reverse: "No people are born with an urge to jump from high places." This latter is the logical contrary of the former and so agreement with both would suggest either a lapse of memory or extreme illogicality. However, disagreement with both would not be illogical. For while the two are contraries they do not between them exhaust the realm of possible opinions. One might hold that, in the absence of definite knowledge, the best view is that there may or may not be people who are born with an urge to jump from high places. An equalitarian who held this view would disagree with both the original F Scale item and its reversal.

Here is another reversal: "Science has its place, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind" becomes "All the mysteries surrounding our lives will sooner or later be cleared up through the progress of science." While the latter is intended to be an equalitarian assertion reversing the former, it impresses me as somewhat more authoritarian than the original. The use of the quite unjustified, dogmatic *all* should recommend it to authoritarians, even those who have agreed with the original version providing only that they do not recollect the detailed content of the original.

It is fun to consider various reversals of F Scale items because in the process you discover some subtleties of linguistic meaning. Think back to our discussion of the A-S Scale and the item: "The trouble with letting Jews into a nice neighborhood is that they gradually give it a typical Jewish atmosphere." Suppose we try a psychological rather than a strictly logical reversal, substituting favorable terms for the unfavorable. "One delightful consequence of having Jews in a neighborhood is that they contribute a charming Jewish quality to the neighborhood atmosphere." It sounds like a gushy clubwoman overcompensating for a covert but especially vicious anti-Semitism. If she were speaking the sentence we would see her mouth give a wry twist and her voice break on "Jewish" in "charming Jewish quality." It is not an item that appeals to the equalitarian in spite of the intended reversal of sentiment.

It is probably not possible to write items that are perfect psychological contraries to the assertions of the F Scale. Each of these latter conveys a very complex pattern of connotations. To reverse that full pattern is not an easy trick. However, as Christie and his associates have shown (1958) the reversals can be better than those we have cited. Witness their: "An urge to jump from high places is probably the result of

unhappy personal experiences rather than something inborn" and their "The findings of science may some day show that many of our most cherished beliefs are wrong." Even Christie's items are not invariably rejected when their reversals have been accepted, but the tendency across numerous subject samples has been in that direction. With these items it is possible to compose F Scales with equal numbers of authoritarian and equalitarian assertions.

Behavior that is consistent for one person over a range of situations and also different from one person to another is a personality characteristic. Response sets to agree or disagree first appeared as sources of error in personality inventories but we have come to realize that they are also personality characteristics in their own right; they may be characteristics of greater interest than most of those that the inventories were designed to measure. In 1960, Couch and Keniston gave names to the two personality types involved—"Yeasayers" and "Naysayers."

Couch and Keniston made a powerful demonstration of the existence of the two kinds of response set. They administered hundreds of items from a large and diversified collection of inventories and assigned each subject an "Over-all Agreement Score" (OAS). Subjects with a high OAS are the Yeasayers and subjects with a low OAS are the Naysayers. Yeasaying and Naysaying were demonstrated to be relatively stable and generalized traits by showing that subjects with a high OAS continued to agree with items from new tests of various kinds and subjects with low OAS continued to disagree. Clinical studies of extreme scorers on the OAS suggested that Yeasayers are individuals with weak ego controls who accept impulses without reservation whereas Naysayers are individuals who control and suppress impulses.

For present purposes the important point is the connection between OAS scores and F Scale scores. Using a short form of the F Scale in which the items are all worded in the same direction (as authoritarian assertions) the correlation with OAS was +.37. Apparently, then, yeasaying is a factor in F Scale scores but it only accounts for about 14 per cent of the variance which means that the content of the items is still the major determinant of scores.¹

It had occurred to several investigators that Yeasaying, since it seems to be a matter of accepting authoritative statements, might itself be a manifestation of authoritarianism. However, Couch and Keniston demonstrated with pure measures of Yeasaying and of authoritarianism

1. Peabody (1961) has reported evidence that it is chiefly negative or anti-content responses that are valid. One can feel more confident that low scorers are opposed to authoritarianism than one can that high scorers are authoritarian. High scores in Peabody's data were largely attributable to acquiescence and seem to represent an absence of definite attitudes.

(using a balanced scale) that the two personality characteristics are completely independent.

In general summary, then, it seems to be certain that a tendency to acquiescence has been a factor in standard F Scale scores but not the major factor. Since acquiescence or Yeasaying is also a factor in many other personality inventories correlations between F Scale scores and other inventory scores may have been generated by acquiescence rather than authoritarianism. In the original Berkeley research the correlations demonstrating the generality of authoritarianism, the correlations among A-S, E, and F scores were probably somewhat elevated by the acquiescence set that was free to operate in all of them. It may be significant that the correlations of A-S, E, and F are somewhat lower with PEC (about .55) than with one another since the PEC scale was balanced with some items asserting conservative attitudes and some asserting liberal attitudes. It is equally certain that acquiescence is not a strong enough factor to have produced all of the correlation among A-S, E, and F and that significant evidence for the generality of authoritarianism remains intact. The results with interviews, TAT stories, and projective questions are exempt from the effects of response set, since with these methods one does not suggest an answer. The fact that the relations demonstrated in this work generally confirm the findings with questionnaires increases our confidence that the questionnaire findings were not entirely generated by response set. Future studies of authoritarianism should employ balanced F Scales, such as have been developed by Christie, and by Couch and Keniston, in order to eliminate the effects of response set.

CRITICISMS OF CONTENT ANALYSES

Content analyses were made of the interviews of both normal subjects and psychiatric patients, as well as of projective sentence completions, and the TAT stories; in short for all data except the questionnaire responses. The methodological criticisms that must be made of these analyses are numerous and serious. The criticisms do not all apply to any one analysis but there was no analysis exempt from all criticism.

Interviewer Knowledge of Questionnaire Responses. In the main interview study forty highly prejudiced persons and forty unprejudiced persons served as subjects. "In each case the interview was preceded by the study, on the part of the interviewer, of the information gathered previously, especially a detailed study of the questionnaire responses" (Adorno, et al., 1950 p. 302). The investigators adopted this practice because the questionnaire responses could help to guide the interviewer in his probing for answers to the underlying questions of the interview schedule.

The coding of the interview protocols was to be done by persons not acquainted with a subject's questionnaire responses. It was perfectly clear to the investigators that if a coder knew he was dealing with the protocols of a prejudiced subject he might be more disposed to find "Rigidity" and "Intolerance of Ambiguity" and "Idealization of Parents" than if he knew he was dealing with the protocols of an unprejudiced subject. Blind coding was employed to obviate the possibility of inducing unreal associations between scale scores and the content of interview protocols. However, the danger warded off in the coding stage had already been welcomed aboard in the interviewing stage.

You may remember that the interview schedule left the interviewer free to determine the particular questions he would ask and the order of their asking. Is it not probable that when an interviewer knew he was dealing with a highly prejudiced subject he tried a little harder to obtain evidence of "Rigidity," "Idealization of Parents," and the like, than when he knew that he was dealing with an unprejudiced subject? Indeed there is fragmentary evidence in the interview quotations of the use of leading questions. Thus, when a respondent spoke of premarital sex relations, the interviewer asked, "All momentary relationships?" (Adorno, et al., 1950, p. 393) If bias did not enter into the questioning itself it may have done so in the interviewer's subsequent effort to make a verbatim record from his own shorthand notes. Expectations we know can have a selective effect on recall.

The "too knowledgeable" interviewer is a defect that occurred only in the major interview study. The interviews with psychiatric patients were taken by social workers and physicians who knew nothing about the authoritarian personality research. Interviews were not involved in the TAT study and the sentence completion study.

Examination of Data in Advance of Coding. This is one criticism that applies to all four content analyses; the investigators invariably examined their data in search of contrasts between prejudiced and unprejudiced subjects before they made up a scoring manual. The coding categories were defined so as to capture the contrasts that seemed to be in the data. The blind coding from the manual is simply an effort to show that differences which appear to exist when one knows whether or not a subject is prejudiced can also be found when one does not know. And also, of course, to show that the content categories can be communicated from one person to another.

If one closely examines two sets of complex multi-dimensional data it will usually be possible to find some differences between the two that are consistent enough to be statistically significant. Suppose all of the conceivable dimensions of contrast were, in the full population of subjects, unrelated to the dimension that governs the division of our data into two

sets. Suppose that across the whole population of middle class Americans none of the coding categories that might be used in an analysis is significantly related to being prejudiced or unprejudiced. It could nevertheless happen that in any small sample from this population some categories would be related to prejudice at such levels of significance as a p of .05 or .01. Consider what the .05 level of significance means: differences as great or greater than the one obtained would not occur more than five times out of a hundred in samples of this size if there were no difference in the population in question. If we had predicted our differences in advance and they were significant at this level we could be reasonably confident that these were not chance outcomes. However, if we permit ourselves to pick over the data until we find something significant then we may simply be seizing upon those few of the hundreds of conceivable contrasts which will in any particular sample fall by chance into a five-times-in-a-hundred pattern of contrast.

What ought to have been done? Probably the investigators needed to search at least one collection of data for contrasts between the prejudiced and unprejudiced. One would have thought, however, that one such free search would have sufficed to establish the personality dynamics we have described: Repression to Projection and Displacement and Anti-intracception to Aggression against Minorities. In subsequent studies the contrasts of content should have been predictable from this theory and these subsequent studies would then have tested the theory. Or, in any particular study, they might have examined only one-half of the data in advance and used the remaining half as a test of expectations generated in the first half. These things were not done in any study but, instead, the full collection of data was always examined in advance.

The Coding of Multiple Variables from the Same Content. In the main interview study something like ninety variables were coded from each total protocol. Remember that the coders in this case were members of the research staff who were thoroughly familiar with the research hypotheses. These hypotheses suggest that one entire set of coded categories will hang together in the protocols of prejudiced subjects and another set in the protocols of unprejudiced subjects. Suppose now that in a given protocol a coder has found some quite unmistakable expressions of Anti-intracception and some clear indications of Extra-punitiveness and so has begun to think of the protocol as the production of a prejudiced person. Suppose it is now time to code for "Conventional Idealization of Parents" vs. "Objective Appraisal." What will he do with the following statement: "Mother was, of course, a very wonderful person. She was very nervous. Irritable only when overdoing" (Adorno, *et al.*, 1950 p. 342). It would seem as though the statement might be interpreted either as "Idealization" or as "Objective Appraisal." If the coder has already decided that he is working on the protocol of a

prejudiced subject will he not be more likely to decide on "Idealization" which is a prejudiced category than if he has decided that he is working on the protocol of an unprejudiced subject? The statement in question was in fact coded as "Idealization."

It is to be expected in these circumstances that two coders, both acquainted with the research hypotheses, will make similar decisions and so show high scoring reliability. However, we cannot tell which of the ninety content categories are truly associated with prejudice and which only seem to be so associated because their scoring has been influenced by the scoring of other categories. The Berkeley investigators undertook to prevent this scoring bias (which they call a "halo effect") by instructing coders to adopt an analytic attitude—dealing with one category at a time in isolation from all others. Probably the coders tried very hard to do this. The difficulty is that we cannot be sure that they succeeded.

It was only the protocols from the main interview study that were coded for multiple variables by the same rater. The interviews with psychiatric patients were coded by seven control raters with each rater scoring *just one variable*. Consequently this smaller interview study is exempt from the present criticism. The TAT stories and responses to projective questions were shuffled so that the several productions of a subject could not be linked together. However, it was possible to score a single response—a story or an answer to a projective question—for more than one category and so there was the possibility of some halo effect. The scoring of one category on a story could influence the decision about another category. The analysis of these data was then somewhat less subject to the present criticism than was the analysis of the main interview protocols but it was not completely exempt.

The Reporting of Reliabilities in Terms of Coding Categories that are too General. For the main interview study nine protocols were coded by two raters. There were some ninety categories to be coded and these were put together as pairs such that one member was identified as a High Prejudice category and the other as a Low Prejudice category. We should like to know how well the authors agreed in their decisions for each pair even though there could only be nine items per pair. We are not given this information but instead *The Authoritarian Personality* reports for both raters the percentage of High categories scored in each total interview. For the most part these are closely similar but closely similar overall percentages do not guarantee closely similar decision patterns on particular categories. Both raters, for example, could have scored half of the pairs as High and half as Low but they might have exactly reversed one another in terms of the particular categories scored each way.

The reliability data reported suggest that coders can agree as to whether a total protocol is more likely to be the product of a prejudiced or an unprejudiced subject. But that reliability is not to the point since

the discussion of the interviews chiefly concerns the particular content categories characteristic of the two kinds of subject. The study does not report the data that would tell us whether the individual categorical judgments can be made in a reliable fashion.

For the TAT and projective question studies, the judgments for which reliability coefficients are reported are not so crude as in the interview study but they are also not at the level of particular content categories which is the level of the discussion of results. For example, the first item among the projective questions asks subjects to say what moods they find particularly unpleasant or disturbing. The Low categories are: "Conscious conflict and guilt; Focal dependency and love-seeking; Open hostility, by self or others, toward love objects." The High categories are: "Violations of conventional values; Threatening or nonsupporting environment; Rumbblings from below; and Omissions." The authors tell us that for answers to this question there was a mean agreement of 93 per cent as to whether an answer was High, Neutral, or Low. But two coders could agree that an answer was High and for one this might be because the response seemed to fall into the category "Violations of conventional values" while for the other it might seem to go in the category "Threatening or nonsupporting environment." We are not told how well coders agreed on particular content categories but conclusions are drawn in terms of these content categories.

It is only in the case of the psychiatric interviews that reliabilities are reported for coding judgments at the level of specificity appropriate to the treatment of results and to the theoretical discussion. Each variable was separately coded and the percentage agreements between a control rater and a principal rater are reported.

AUTHORITARIANISM AND EDUCATION—IQ—SES

In *The Authoritarian Personality* there is a chapter that reports on the relations of ethnocentrism with IQ and with education. Table 10-1

TABLE 10-1. MEAN WECHSLER-BELLEVUE IQ SCORE FOR EACH QUARTILE OF THE ETHNOCENTRISM SCALE (PSYCHIATRIC CLINIC, MEN AND WOMEN)

(From *The Authoritarian Personality* by T. W. Adorno, et al. Copyright 1950 by The American Jewish Committee. Reprinted with the permission of Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated.)

Form 45 E Scale quartiles	Range on E	N	Mean IQ
Low quartile	10-24	8	125.3
Low middle quartile	25-36	5	117.8
High middle quartile	37-50	13	113.9
High quartile	51-70	11	107.3
		37	114.9

TABLE 10-2. MEAN NUMBER OF YEARS OF EDUCATION FOR EACH QUARTILE OF THE ETHNOCENTRISM SCALE (PSYCHIATRIC CLINIC, MEN AND WOMEN)

(From *The Authoritarian Personality* by T. W. Adorno, et al. Copyright 1950 by The American Jewish Committee. Reprinted with the permission of Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated.)

Form 45 E Scale quartiles	Range on E	N	Mean yrs. education
Low quartile	10-24	29	13.8
Low middle quartile	25-36	28	12.7
High middle quartile	37-50	27	11.8
High quartile	51-70	28	11.2
		112	12.4

presents one set of findings for IQ and Table 10-2 a set of findings for education. From one subject sample to another the correlations vary in size but they are invariably negative (E scores rise as IQ or years of education fall), generally significantly greater than zero but generally below .5. The authors conclude that there is a significant but not very large relation between ethnocentrism and the other two variables.

Hyman and Sheatsley (1954) in their critique of the Berkeley Study report data from a National Opinion Research Council survey showing the associations between five particular F Scale items and years of education. These are reproduced as Table 10-3 and they show a perfectly consistent decline of authoritarianism with increasing education. Hyman and Sheatsley also point to a number of differences between the prejudiced and unprejudiced, attributed to personality dynamics in the original study, that have a more obvious and plausible explanation in terms of education. For example, one of the projective questions asked: "What great people do you admire most?" Unprejudiced subjects named Whitman, Pushkin, Beethoven, Voltaire, Comte, Freud, and Pestalozzi among others. Prejudiced subjects named General Marshall, General MacArthur, Lindbergh, the Pope, Henry Ford, and Bing Crosby among others. The researchers conceptualize the difference by saying that the unprejudiced value intellectual, scientific, aesthetic, and social achievements while the prejudiced value power, control, and conservative Americana. There is a simpler rubric: the names listed by the prejudiced are known to everybody in the United States while those listed by the unprejudiced are only known to the better educated.

IQ and years of education are, of course, positively correlated. In addition, years of education is one index of socio-economic status (SES) and is somewhat correlated with such others as income and possessions. In addition there are certain less obvious correlates of the individual variables: probably more schooling goes with being moderately young

TABLE 10-3. AGREEMENT WITH F SCALE ITEMS AND EDUCATION

	College N = 217	High school N = 545	Grammar school N = 504
Agree that:			
The most important thing to teach children is absolute obedience to their parents	35%	60%	80%
Any good leader should be strict with people under him in order to gain their respect	36	51	66
Prison is too good for sex criminals. They should be publicly whipped or worse	18	31	45
There are two kinds of people in the world: the weak and the strong	30	53	71
No decent man can respect a woman who has had sex relations before marriage	14	26	39

rather than elderly since the availability of education has increased in our lifetimes. Consequently we must suppose that ethnocentrism and authoritarianism are somewhat related to a great bundle of variables having something to do with socio-economic status; the relationship seems to be negative.

How strong are the correlations between ethnocentrism and IQ, education, or other related variables? There have been a number of studies on this point, and Christie (1954), after reviewing them, estimates that the correlation between either IQ and F scores or years of education and F scores would, for a representative cross-sectional sample, range between $-.50$ and $-.60$. In the Berkeley studies the range of intelligence and education was, for the most part, quite restricted and restriction of range would operate to keep down the value of correlation coefficients. Christie found that in the various studies that have been reported the size of the correlation increased as the range increased. For this reason he argues that $-.50$ to $-.60$ is a reasonable estimate for correlations based on a full range on both IQ and F scores. IQ, and years of education are themselves positively correlated. Christie estimates that with education partialled out the correlation between intelligence and F scores is only about $-.20$. It seems to be chiefly education or cultural sophistication, rather than intelligence *per se* that reduces authoritarianism.

What is the implication of the fact that the components of the authoritarian syndrome are correlated with education and SES? You remember that the Berkeley researchers held that the covariation of a mixed lot of attitudes and traits having no clear logical relationship

argues for the existence of a unifying personality dynamic. Critics have contended that this position is destroyed by the demonstration of a correlation with education and SES. The numerous components of authoritarianism are found together in a person simply because they are the norms of his subculture—the little-educated, less bright, low SES subculture. To this we must respond by asking: Why does this subculture put its norms together as it does? Why should self-glorification, parent idealization, impunitiveness, anti-intracception, and prejudice cohere as a set of norms? The question is there whether you ask it for the individual or for the group.

It is possible, however, that low IQ, education, and SES can account for the syndrome without recourse to personality dynamics. Perhaps parents with low SES stamp out all aggression against authority in their children because it is likely to lead to delinquency and trouble with the police. Perhaps people with low SES are prejudiced against Negroes because it takes severe discrimination to keep the Negro beneath them in status. They may be prejudiced against Jews because the stereotype of the ruthless, clannish Jew accounts in an agreeable way for his occasional economic ascendance. Perhaps the person of low SES is not reflective or introspective because he is too busy hustling to earn a living. We can easily imagine plausible reasons for the association of each authoritarian trait with the cluster that includes low IQ, little education and low SES and so the explanation of the covariation among the traits is simply their several particular ties to the same underlying factors.

In what way does the above account differ from the one offered by the Berkeley group? Both explain the covariation of traits but the question is whether those traits are a bundle or a system. If we account for their coherence entirely in terms of particular ties with income and education and the like then the coherence is simply incidental to their common dependence on the same factors. The components hang together but are not interdependent. The Berkeley group contends, however, that the proscription of any aggression against authority requires ethnic prejudice because aggression must somehow be released. Proscription of aggression against authority in combination with ethnic prejudice requires that there be little introspection or reflection because self-examination would disturb the system of repression, displacement, and rationalization. It is the view of the Berkeley group that the components of the authoritarian syndrome hang together because they are a working system. [If it is true that these components are the norms of an underprivileged subculture then I think] the contribution of the Berkeley research is to show that this combination of norms makes a viable pattern for human personalities. Norms are not put together at random or incidentally.

When they stabilize into a particular combination it must be because that is a combination that works for human personalities.

In *The Authoritarian Personality* some importance is assigned to SES. It is status concern or anxiety that is presumed to cause certain parents to interpret their parental role in an authoritarian way and from this role-interpretation all the rest is supposed to follow. In 1954 Else Frenkel-Brunswik wrote a paper called *Further Explorations by a Contributor to "The Authoritarian Personality"* (Christie & Jahoda, 1954) in which she described an extensive study of prejudice in children and adolescents. In this work there were interviews with parents of children who were extremely high in prejudice and also with parents of children low in prejudice. Frenkel-Brunswik reports that the subjective feeling of socio-economic "marginality" on the part of the parents rather than their objective SES was the crucial factor in ethnocentrism. A feeling of marginality is said to exist when there is a discrepancy between actual status and the status one aspires to. "Marginality" seems to be much the same as the status concern of the original study.

However, while marginality may be the crucial factor it is evident that Frenkel-Brunswik also found the familiar negative correlation between F scores and SES. She reports a "relatively high percentage of ethnocentric families among the workers . . ." (p. 233). It is easy to imagine a reconciliation of the two aspects of SES that seem to engender authoritarianism. Perhaps the feeling of marginality is the critical factor but feelings of marginality may be especially likely to arise at the lower end of the SES scale, among the working class. The latter part of this reconciliation does not sit well with the liberal intellectual since fascism is supposed to be a movement of the lower middle class rather than of the proletariat.

Nevertheless the evidence is strong that the lower the SES the higher the F score. The idea that marginality creates ethnocentrism, on the other hand, is highly dubitable. MacKinnon and Centers (1956) used a brief F Scale in a public opinion survey of Los Angeles County. With regard to objective SES they found the usual thing: working-class, lower-education groups were exceptionally authoritarian. In addition, these investigators asked each informant to say in what class he placed himself and to rate the strength of his sense of membership in that class. For those who identified themselves as middle class and also for those who identified themselves as working class, those who also identified themselves as "borderline," the "peripheral" members of the classes were *least* authoritarian. If the "borderline" of MacKinnon and Centers is the same as the "margin" of Frenkel-Brunswik then somebody is wrong. Actually the two studies may not be contradictory; it is possible that the so-called "borderline" cases of MacKinnon and Centers were simply unconcerned about social classes rather than insecure about their own positions.

In summary, SES, intelligence, and education are all negatively related to F scores and the relationships are stronger than the Berkeley authors had realized. Of the various negative correlates it seems to be education that is strongest. Kornhauser, Sheppard and Mayer (1956) found that among men who were all auto workers, those with an eighth grade education or less were more authoritarian than those with a greater amount of education. Cohn and Carsch (1954) showed that among workers in a German cosmetics factory, those who had attended *Hochschule* had lower F scores than those with less education. Authoritarianism may be the world-view of the uneducated in western industrial societies. It may be that this world-view hangs together because of the dynamic interrelations among the parts posited by the Berkeley research.

After the Critique

What of *The Authoritarian Personality* survives the many devastating criticisms of its methods? Hyman and Sheatsley (1954) summarize their masterful methodological critique by saying: "Our major criticisms lead us inevitably to conclude that the authors' theory has not been proved by the data they cite . . ." (p. 119). Notice the care with which this conclusion is formulated: the theory has not been proved by a particular set of data. A methodological critique cannot conclude that a theory is mistaken. Ultimately of course it is the correctness of the theory that we care about. What would be the best opinion on this important matter? By this time you have probably formed an opinion and so have I. How well do we agree?

There are really two sets of methodological criticisms dividing neatly into those that apply to the work with questionnaires and those that apply to the work with projective methods. The most serious defects in the questionnaire work are the inadequate sampling and the operation of response sets. Both criticisms are sound. In spite of their cogency it seems to me that there is a substantial residual probability that the chief conclusion of the questionnaire work is correct: attitudes of anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, and authoritarianism do generally go together.

You remember that studies done since the original book, though never based on fully adequate samples, do very consistently find significant relations among these attitudes. There seems never to have been a report of a negative relationship. Response set has certainly magnified the size of these relations but, from the evidence, the effects of response set are not great enough completely to wash out the relations. Finally, some of the findings of the questionnaire study were replicated in the projectives study and, while this latter work has its own deficiencies, some account must be taken of the convergence in the two sets of data.

Christie and Cook (1958) have published a bibliography of research relating to the authoritarian personality through 1956. They list 230 titles. In their summary of the work they write: "Although there are serious problems in evaluating research, the over-all picture shows consistency of findings in many of the most intensively studied areas. The E and F Scales are found to be significantly correlated in a wide array of samples and predictions of relationships with attitudinal measures are almost invariably confirmed" (p. 189). I take this conclusion to be about the same as mine.

The flaws in the study of projectives are more serious: interviewer knowledge of the interviewees' questionnaire responses; derivation of scoring categories from prior examination of data; coding of multiple variables from the same data; inadequate reports of coding reliability. Each study of projective materials was flawed by at least one of these and so there are grounds for dismissing the evidence of each study. My own evaluation differs from that of Hyman and Sheatsley in that I should like to give some weight to the congruence of evidence across the main interviews, TAT's, projective questions, and psychiatric interviews.

There is only one criticism that applies to all four studies: the derivation of scoring categories from prior examination of data. What the authors ought to have done in their first study is to examine a part of their data in search of discriminating categories and use the remainder to test. The four studies taken together suggest that the categories would have survived such a test. Suppose we consider one of the studies, for example the main interview study, as the preliminary examination of data in search of categories. Since the other studies employ some categories that are the same as or closely similar to those used with the main interviews it would seem that the authors could have used these studies as tests and need not have made preliminary examinations of data. The fact that they did make such examinations does not completely vitiate the force of the convergence in the findings.

Finally we can be more affirmative than Hyman and Sheatsley because we are not doing a critique of the Berkeley study but are trying to decide on the tenability of its conclusions in view of all the studies that have been done. Perhaps the least well-supported of all the findings in the Berkeley study are those concerning the genesis of authoritarianism in childhood. To begin with, the data were all obtained from adult recollections and such recollections can be grossly inaccurate. Secondly, the data were nearly all obtained in the main interview study and not directly checked in the projective materials; the main interview study had many methodological defects. However, Frenkel-Brunswik has directly studied prejudice in childhood and adolescence. She reports confirmation of most of the original findings.

"It was found that, at least after the age of ten, children's personali-

ties tend to fall into patterns similar to those observed in the adults described in *The Authoritarian Personality*. Thus ethnocentric youngsters tend to display authoritarian aggression, rigidity, cruelty, superstition, externalization, and projectivity, denial of weakness, power orientation, and tend toward dichotomous conceptions of sex roles, of kinds of people, and of values" (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1954). In the homes of the ethnocentric children discipline was strict, rigid, and punitive. Unprejudiced children were more apt to see both positive and negative features in their parents; they were more able to accept feelings of love and hate for the same persons. Prejudiced children seemed compelled to see their parents as wholly good though there were indications that they also saw them, covertly, as wholly bad. Prejudiced children conceived it to be the chief business of both parents and teachers to discipline their charges and keep them in line. While Frenkel-Brunswik published several partial reports of this work (1949, 1953, 1954), she never made a complete report and that is unfortunate in view of its considerable importance.

On the level of covariation, of one variable correlated with another, the findings of *The Authoritarian Personality* seem to me to be quite well established. Anti-Semitism goes with ethnocentrism goes with anti-intracception goes with idealization of parents and self goes with authoritarian discipline in childhood goes with a rigid conception of sex roles, etc. Two of the presumptive correlates are not well established: status-concern or marginality and the cognitive style characterized by rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity.

On the level of interpretation, the level on which repression is supposed to lead to displacement, rationalization, and anti-intracception, things are less certain. These ideas about personality dynamics cannot be proved by correlation. Studies of an entirely different kind are needed. Is it the case, for example, that if an authoritarian somehow became able to tolerate ambivalence, to see faults in himself and his parents, that he would thereupon lose his prejudices or at any rate become able to adjust them to fact? One would have to find a way of bringing ambivalence into consciousness (psychotherapy? hypnosis?) without in any way directly attacking the prejudice. It would not be an easy kind of research to do and it has not been done.

The major alternative to the personality dynamic explanation of the covariation is the suggestion that the traits of the authoritarian cohere simply because they are the norms of people with little education and low SES. For each particular trait one could work out some plausible derivation from one or another aspect of SES. The dynamic explanation would make the coherence tighter by showing how one trait supports another, not logically but in terms of the needs and defenses postulated

by psychoanalytic theory. It is likely that both sets of forces—the dynamic interrelations as well as the ties with status and education—cooperate to hold this mosaic together.

Is There an Authoritarian of the Left?

The best measure of authoritarianism is the F Scale. It is objective and quantitative and much easier to use than interview protocols or projective data. However, the F Scale was characterized by the authors in two ways: 1) As a means of identifying fascist proclivities or an authoritarianism of the right; 2) as a means of identifying authoritarianism in general and this presumably could be of the left as well as of the right. The authors do not actually demonstrate a connection between F Scale scores and affiliation with fascist political parties. The three inmates of San Quentin who were called fascists were so labelled by the researchers because of their violently antidemocratic views rather than because they were members of a fascist party. We shall first inquire whether the F Scale can identify genuine political fascists to see if it is a measure of authoritarianism of the right. If it is we shall then want to know whether it is only a measure of authoritarianism of the right or whether it can also identify authoritarians of the left—if such there be.

THE F SCALE SCORES OF FASCISTS AND COMMUNISTS

In the 1930's, more than a decade before the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality*, Stagner developed a scale for the assessment of fascist attitudes. In German and Italian fascist writings he identified seven characteristic content areas: 1) nationalism, 2) imperialism, 3) militarism, 4) racial antagonism, 5) anti-radicalism, 6) middle-class consciousness, and 7) a benevolent despot or strong-man philosophy of government. The first five of these areas suggest the content of the A-S and E scales and scores on these scales are highly correlated with F Scale scores. The last two seem to have been directly covered in the F Scale. Some of Stagner's items have near-matches in the F Scale; for example, from Stagner's scale we have: "America has plenty of plans—what it needs is strong men who are willing to work for recovery"; the F Scale includes: "What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, is a few courageous, tireless devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith." In sum, the ideological content found to be characteristic of fascism in Stagner's independent study (1936) is very similar to the content of the scales used to assess authoritarianism.

During World War II there were opportunities to investigate the per-

sonality characteristics of captured Nazis. Dicks (1950) conducted psychiatric interviews with 138 German POW's, some of whom were fanatical Nazis and some of whom were either politically uninvolved or else active anti-Nazis. At several points Dicks' description of the traits characteristic of the fanatical Nazis resembles the Berkeley characterization of the authoritarian. The fanatical Nazi was lacking in rebellion against his father; he showed sadism, projectivity, and a tabu on tenderness.

These fragments of indirect evidence are helpful but one waits for the decisive demonstration. What are the F Scale scores of members of fascist parties? Cohn and Carsch (1954) had the scale translated into German and they administered it in 1952 to 140 workers in a German cosmetics factory. The mean F score was 5.26 and the standard deviation was .86. This mean score was, at the time, the highest that had ever been reported; The San Quentin prisoners had the highest mean of the groups studied in the Berkeley research but that mean was only 4.73. If one makes the assumption that these German workers were former Nazis then the data support the validity of the claim that the F Scale measures fascist tendencies. However, we do not know that the workers had all been Nazis. In addition, the sample was working class, and low SES groups everywhere have had high F scores. Further, some students of the F Scale (e.g., Peabody) doubt that it is possible strictly to "translate" the complex and subtle assertions of the scale from English into another language.

Can the scale be validated with English-speaking political fascists? The problem is to find them. In the immediate postwar period they could not be found in the United States. Today there are the George Lincoln Rockwell Nazis but they have not been studied. Luckily (from the research point of view) England has had an avowedly fascist group—the followers of Sir Oswald Mosely.

Coulter (1953) administered the F Scale to forty-three English Fascists, also to forty-three English Communists, and also to eighty-three English soldiers who did not belong to either political extreme. All subjects are said to have been of the working class. Coulter's research was done under the direction of H. J. Eysenck of London's Maudsley Hospital and we will, a little further on, discuss the several results of this study in connection with Eysenck's theory of the organization of attitudes.

The mean score of the Fascist men (Christie, 1956a, has calculated the means from Eysenck's report in *The Psychology of Politics*, 1954) was 5.30. The range of possible scores on the F Scale is from 1.0 to 7.0 with 4.0 the theoretical neutral point. American college students usually score in the range from 3.0 to 4.0. The highest group mean published

before Coulter's study was the 5.26 reported by Cohn and Carsch (1954) for German workers. The Coulter result is therefore a strong confirmation of the claim that the F Scale measures fascistic trends.

The mean score of the forty-three working-class Communists (according to Christie, 1956a,) studied by Coulter was 3.13 and the score of the "politically neutral" soldiers was 2.50; the Communists were slightly above the soldiers but far below the Fascists. Eysenck draws from Coulter's data the truly extraordinary conclusion: ". . . we have found Communists to make almost as high scores on this scale as Fascists" (Eysenck, 1954, p. 149) and argues that the F Scale is not just a measure of fascistic tendencies but of authoritarianism in general. It would seem to be a more reasonable summary of the data to say that Communists scored slightly above neutrals but much below Fascists and so the F Scale is primarily a measure of authoritarianism of the right though slightly sensitive to the authoritarianism of the left. However, even this version must be questioned.

As Christie (1956a) has pointed out, Coulter's "neutral" soldiers were an extraordinarily equalitarian group. Their mean F Scale score is the lowest-but-one of the fifty or so group means known to Christie. It is well below the usual level of American college students and also well below some means obtained by Rokeach (1960) for samples of English college students. It looks as if Coulter's Communists are more authoritarian than the "neutrals" only because the neutrals are very exceptionally non-authoritarian.

The Communists' score of 3.13 falls in the lower part of the range of data available on American groups and on English college students. In absolute terms the mean is on the equalitarian side of the theoretical neutral point on the scale which falls at 4.0. Neither relatively nor absolutely is it clear that Coulter's Communists are authoritarian.

Among the subjects tested in the original Berkeley study there were nine who identified themselves as Communists and fifty-four who were attending the California Labor School, an organization designated by the Attorney General as under the domination of the Communist Party. The F Scale scores of these subjects unfortunately are not separated out in *The Authoritarian Personality*. However, Christie (1956a) has shown by some ingenious reasoning and comparing of tables of data that these scores must have been relatively low.

Finally, Rokeach (1960), visiting in Great Britain, obtained F Scale scores from thirteen Communist college students. Their mean was the lowest of five political groups studied and it was significantly lower than the means of Liberal Party students and Labor Party students of the Atleeite persuasion.

All of these Communist samples have been absurdly small and prob-

ably unrepresentative of total membership. Still the consistently low scores, always on the equalitarian side of neutrality and apparently near the bottom of the range for all groups tested, strongly indicate that Communists in *democratic countries* do not produce high scores on the authoritarianism scale. This can mean either of two things: 1) The F Scale only measures authoritarianism of the right or fascism; 2) the F Scale measures general authoritarianism, in some sense, but communists in democratic countries are not authoritarian. In any event the Berkeley researchers seem to have been correct in their belief that the F Scale is a measure of fascism.

In 1944 Edwards, in an article on fascism in America, quoted a Washington newspaper as follows: "Anyone whose opinion differs from our own is now known as fascist" (p. 301). For more recent times that statement could stand but with *communist* substituted for fascist. A great many of us have lived through both periods and have been "worked up" against both enemies. The F Scale and the research on the authoritarian personality provides a single dimension for the description of political ideologies and on this dimension our two ideological antagonists are opposite extremes. That is not a cognitively satisfying state of affairs. It makes it difficult, for instance, to find an attractive ideological stance for the United States; a rather empty moderation or neutrality is the only consistent position that will justify our antagonism to two extremes. Beyond that it is not satisfying, somehow, to feel that two villains are totally unlike. As we shall see in Chapter 11 the human mind prefers to think of the evil things in this world as clustered together in opposition to the good things. There is an agreeable cognitive simplicity in dichotomous evaluation. It would be most satisfying to find that communism and fascism are somehow alike and that we have, all along, been consistently opposed to this quality they have in common. Perhaps it is this strain toward cognitive simplicity that caused Eysenck to see in Coulter's data the greater authoritarianism of both Fascists and Communists rather than the closeness of Communists to neutrals.

Of course there are some real similarities between the fascist and communist movements of our time. Shils (1954) has pointed out that Italian and German fascism were conservative or right wing in their concern with national traditions and the value they set on private property, but they were leftist (in nineteenth-century terms) in their governmental regulation of industry and in this respect similar to Soviet Communism. The latter movement has been leftist in its humanitarian social welfare plans and in its attitude to private property but it has resembled fascism in its suppression of civil liberties.

Throughout *The Authoritarian Personality* there are intimations that one dimension may not be adequate to the description of modern

ideologies. The authors toy with a distinction between active, militant liberals and passive, inhibited liberals and with a distinction between "genuine conservatives" and "pseudoconservatives." Shils has taken them to task for not making more of these distinctions; he believes that the Berkeley group was oversold on a liberal-fascist dichotomy. There have been recent attempts to find more dimensions in the structure of attitudes and, in particular, a dimension that will put communism somewhere close to fascism.

THE R AND T FACTORS

Eysenck has proposed (1954) that two independent (orthogonal) dimensions will do the job. His dimensions were not political deductions but inductions from data on the intercorrelation among attitudes. He began by examining some five hundred opinion items drawn from a great variety of published attitude scales. From this set he selected every item that had proved to be "of importance or relevance in any previous research." Eysenck wanted a total of forty items and since he did not find that many that were of established importance he filled up the quota by random selection from the original five hundred. For each item a subject could respond on a 5-point Agree-Disagree scale. Eysenck's analysis of the data is based on 750 middle-class subjects; 250 each from the Conservative, Liberal, and Socialist parties.

Factor Analysis. The two orthogonal dimensions were discovered by the method called *factor analysis*. In this method one begins by correlating the scores on each item with each other item. From the resultant correlation matrix the analyst works out a set of reference dimensions (his factors) which will provide an economical description of the total pattern of relations. He can then select items that are good measures of these dimensions and throw away those that are not.

The mathematical techniques of factor analysis are complicated (see Guilford, 1954), but the basic idea is as simple as correlation itself. A correlation indicates whether two tests possess some common element. Binet applied this reasoning when he decided that, since his intellectual tests were all substantially intercorrelated they must all be influenced by a single general factor of intelligence. Spearman (1904) developed the basic theory of factor analysis in connection with the study of mental ability. Since almost all ability tests are intercorrelated Spearman held that there is evidence of a very general intellectual ability (Spearman's "G") but since the correlations are not perfect there is also evidence of many particular abilities, specific to the individual tests. Spearman and his students found that many correlation matrices included tests having something in common among themselves that was not shared with all

tests. They, at first, spoke of "overlapping specific factors" but nowadays we speak of group factors. From a factor analysis of fifty-six cognitive tests Thurstone (1938) discovered six predominant group factors which he called the primary mental abilities. In factor analyzing scores on forty attitude items Eysenck was looking for the group factors that constitute the primary dimensions of ideology.

Thurstone's analysis has not proved to be an ultimate statement about the way human abilities are organized. Three of the primary mental abilities were suggested by the content of tests that clustered together: Verbal (V), Number (N), and Spatial (S). The other three were named in terms of cognitive processes that seemed to be involved in the tests: Word fluency (W), Memory (M), and Reasoning (R). Guilford (1957), as an outcome of a long series of studies of intellectual performance, distinguishes four kinds of content, five cognitive processes, and, in addition, six kinds of cognitive product. Guilford's types of content and types of process are not identical with Thurstone's. Guilford's processes, for instance, are: Memory, Cognition, Convergent Thinking, Divergent Thinking, and Evaluation. Since there are, in Guilford's system five processes, four content categories and six products there are 120 different combinations and 120 different conceivable mental abilities.

Guilford's is only one of a number of factor-analytic descriptions of mental abilities (Cronbach, 1960) offered as alternatives to the Thurstone description. This outcome of the application of factor analysis to the study of mental abilities warns us that any one factor analysis of the attitudinal domain, such as the one made by Eysenck, is unlikely to be the last word. In the analysis of any particular matrix of correlations there are several matters which are resolved by the investigator's judgment rather than by completely determinate mathematical procedures. In addition the factors found in one set of items for one sample of subjects may not be found with different items or different subjects.

A correlation table describes similarities between one attitude item and each other attitude item. The factor analyst suggests reference axes for describing all such similarities. Cronbach (1960) puts it this way: "The process is like that of describing the location of a home. Jones lives next to Smith and Adams, and half a block from Brown and White, three blocks from James, Thomas, and Schultz. This description (which resembles a row in the correlation table) is useless if the person seeking Jones does not know where those others live and inconvenient when he does know. So we introduce a reference system. We locate Jones as north of Main Street and west of State. Or we say he lives on this side of the highway, across the railroad tracks and beyond the ice plant. We can place any home in relation to these reference lines"

(p. 255). As you know, if you think of the various ways of describing the location of any particular building, there are always many alternative descriptions—all equally correct but employing different reference lines. In quite similar fashion there are always numerous alternative descriptions of the similarities among attitude items, descriptions that employ different reference axes.

Rotation is a process by which the analyst of a correlation matrix seeks to find the best location for his axes. Thurstone (1947) favored rotation to what is called "simple structure." One of the things one does in rotating to simple structure is to place the axes so that as many tests as possible are nearly perfect measures of just one factor. The factor loading of a test is the correlation between the test and a factor, and simple structure exists when many tests have high loadings on single factors and near-zero loadings on all other factors.

In practice, unfortunately, correlation matrices occur for which there are several solutions all equally near to simple structure and so no unique solution can be said to exist. In such cases the analyst turns to other criteria which are in general less compelling. One such is to locate the axes where they make the best psychological sense but this involves the tricky business of naming and conceptualizing the axes or factors.

Interpretation of a group factor is essentially an effort to induce a concept from a number of particulars. One takes note of the tests that have substantial loadings on the same group factor (are highly inter-correlated) and contrasts them with tests having low or zero loadings on this factor. If it were a matrix of ability tests we might find that tests loaded on one factor all involved verbal understanding while tests not loaded on the factor, but substantially loaded on a second factor, might all involve numerical operations. A pattern of this kind would suggest a verbal factor and a numerical factor. The interpretation of a factor is, properly considered, only a hypothesis. The so-called verbal factor might, with more tests, prove to be word fluency or vocabulary comprehension or verbal reasoning or something else. What the factor analyst should do, but very often does not do, is to test this conceptualization by writing new tests or items which, according to his understanding of the factor, ought to show a high loading. If these new materials are included in a new administration and are inter-correlated as his concept has predicted then he can feel more confident that the concept is correct. In rotating axes so as to give them psychological meaning one seeks to find locations that can be given an interpretation in psychological theory. This was an important consideration in Eysenck's solution of the matrix obtained from attitude items.

It is fairly obvious that the factors obtained in any given analysis

are a function of the tests or attitude items employed. With a small number of rather homogeneous verbal tests and a small number of homogeneous arithmetical tests we might get factors that would suggest the terms Verbal and Numerical. If, to the original tests, we added a diverse collection of new tests the original factors might differentiate into several varieties of verbal ability and the Number factor into Arithmetical Operations, Mathematical Reasoning, Spatial Visualization, Mathematical Background, etc. Thurstone's Primary Mental Abilities identified the common elements in the tests he used and these were the common tests of the day. Thurstone could not find ability factors for which no tests had been devised and one reason for the contemporary proliferation of mental abilities is simply the contemporary proliferation of tests. Similarly any description of the structure or organization of social attitudes that is based on factor analysis is relative to the attitude items analyzed.

While it may be obvious that an analysis depends on the items used it seems to be less obvious that a given set of items need not always have the same factor structure. For the analysis also depends on the subjects involved. The structure of abilities is probably more stable across subject samples than is the structure of attitudes. We shall want to consider seriously the possibility that, for people of moderate political views, people who belong to the major institutionalized political parties, all kinds of *extremist* attitudes may be equally unacceptable and so cluster together. However, for a sample that includes various kinds of political extremists these views may separate out into two or more dimensions; the views acceptable to one extreme group being unacceptable to another and vice versa.

Conceptualizing R and T. From the intercorrelations of 40 items across 750 subjects Eysenck extracted two factors. The items defining the first factor were grouped into two opposing sets. On the one hand we find a belief that private property should be abolished, that the death penalty should go, that Sunday observance is old-fashioned, that patriotism is a force that works against peace, and the like. On the other hand, we find a belief that nationalization of industries is inefficient, that we should go back to religion, that Jews are too powerful and colored peoples are inferior, that conscientious objectors are traitors, and the like. Eysenck called this factor *radicalism-conservatism* (the R Factor) and this conceptualization is supported by the differential item responses of the members of the three British political parties. For the most part, items having a high positive saturation with the factor (conservative items) were more acceptable to Conservative Party members than to Socialists. For items having a high negative saturation the pattern of acceptance was reversed. The mean factor scores of three

parties, that is scores on the items defining the radicalism-conservatism dimension, distributed the parties from left to right in the order: Conservative-Liberal-Socialist.

The second factor is more problematical. At one extreme the beliefs that: Our troubles have moral causes; birth control should be illegal; we should abolish the death penalty and aim at curing criminals rather than punishing them; and the like. The contrasting set includes the beliefs that: war is inherent in human nature; compulsory sterilization of persons with serious hereditary defects is desirable; the Japanese are cruel by nature; and the like. It is not very meaningful to wind up these two lists with the phrase "and the like" because the like of those listed is not obvious. They are a rather heterogeneous collection. So also are the items in the radical and conservative cluster; the only "concept" one can discover in conservative beliefs is a preference for things as they are or used to be as opposed to the radical's taste for change. However, the radical-conservative dimension is a familiar political reality and the characterization of the factor is validated by the performance of political groups having well-known positions. There are no terms in familiar political parlance that fit the second factor.

Eysenck found his terms in a book by William James (1907) where they refer to two supposed poles of human temperament: the *tender-minded* and the *tough-minded* (T Factor). James lists the presumed characteristics of each.

<i>The tender-minded</i>	<i>The tough-minded</i>
Rationalistic (going by "principles")	Empiricist (going by "facts")
Intellectualistic	Sensationalistic
Idealistic	Materialistic
Optimistic	Pessimistic
Religious	Irreligious
Free-willist	Fatalistic
Monistic	Pluralistic
Dogmatical	Skeptical

It is as impossible to find a conceptual contrast in James's two lists as it was to find them in Eysenck's original items. The lists may nevertheless have a psychological coherence but one suspects that they were a better description of the opposed poles of late 19th and early 20th century philosophy (see especially Ralph Waldo Emerson) than they are of the ordinary man's ideology. Beyond this the "fit" between James's lists and Eysenck's items is not very good. There seem to be no items relevant to such pairs as "Monistic-Pluralistic" and "Intellectualistic-Sensationalistic."

James's list does not include a contrast "Humane" and "Inhumane" but that is a contrast that seems appropriate to very many items; e.g., the tough-minded favor the death penalty, harsh punishment of criminals, even flogging while the tender-minded favor re-education of criminals, are pacifistic, and do not regard conscientious objectors as traitors. The humane-inhumane opposition is, of course, suggested by the terms "tender" and "tough." In the end it may be this connotation plus the linking in James's scheme of religious and tender against irreligious and tough that constituted its appeal for Eysenck.

In support of his two-dimensional theory of attitude organization Eysenck has reanalyzed results reported by other investigators, all of them American, and found that the data could reasonably be represented with the radicalism-conservatism, tender-minded and tough-minded axes (1944). He also reports (1954) that the forty items of his inventory have been administered to American, German, and Swedish groups and that the results obtained were similar. However, these empirical studies of intercorrelations can never finally establish a particular dimensional analysis. Ferguson (1939), for instance, made a careful factor analytic study of attitudes that overlap those studied by Eysenck and came out with a different solution. Ferguson also found two main independent factors but he located them differently and identified them as *religionism* and *humanitarianism*. There is greater intellectual appeal in Eysenck's description chiefly because of the way he proposes to handle communism and fascism.

Our problem, you remember, is that communism and fascism are opposite extremes on a left to right or radicalism-conservatism dimension. But we think we see similarities between the two and we are sure that we would like to see them since our antagonism to both would then have a simple explanation. The solution Eysenck has proposed is elegant. We must conceive of modern politics as a two-dimensional rather than a one-dimensional arena. Opposites on one dimension can be near neighbors on the second dimension. And so communism and fascism though respectively the extreme left and right are both tough-minded. The solution appears in Figure 10-1 as a schematic diagram.

R and T in Relation to Learning. In addition to proposing an elegant resolution of our political quandaries Eysenck has developed his two-dimensional theory in such a way as to relate political attitudes to general psychological theory. His fundamental proposal is that we conceive of attitudes as habits which are learned, a proposal that Doob (1947) and others have also made. Eysenck then declares himself in agreement with the many psychologists who have recognized two fundamental kinds of learning: instrumental learning in accordance with the reinforcement principle, and classical conditioning in accordance




FIGURE 10-1. SCHEMATIC DIAGRAMS ILLUSTRATING TWO HYPOTHESES REGARDING THE POSITIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

with the contiguity principle. Finally, it is Eysenck's position that the attitudes called radical and conservative are instrumental habits acquired because they bring rewards whereas the attitudes called tender-minded and tough-minded reflect different degrees of classically conditioned inhibition.

In reviewing the two kinds of learning it will help to have two model experiments in mind. For instrumental learning we can think of the rat in a Skinner box learning to press a lever because that action is instrumental to the production of food pellets. For classical conditioning the case that is most closely related to Eysenck's argument is the conditioned fear experiment in which an animal hears a buzzer shortly before it is given an electric shock. After a number of trials the fear originally aroused by the shock, but not by the buzzer, will be aroused by the buzzer before any shock is delivered.

Among learning theorists there is not perfect agreement on the exact nature of the distinction between these two kinds of learning nor on

what they are to be called. What Hilgard and Marquis (1940) call instrumental conditioning, Skinner (1938) calls operant conditioning. The Law of Effect that Thorndike discerned in this kind of instrumental learning (1911) is more commonly called the reinforcement principle today. The second sort of learning is called classical conditioning by Hilgard and Marquis and respondent conditioning by Skinner.

Among theorists who have accepted the idea that there are two kinds of learning of the kind described, it is O. H. Mowrer (1950) whom Eysenck most closely follows. Mowrer held that instrumental learning involves the skeletal muscles and the central nervous system, that it corresponds roughly to what is popularly called voluntary action. Classical conditioning, in Mowrer's (1950) view, involved the glands and smooth muscles and the autonomic nervous system and the responses conditioned are those that are popularly called involuntary. The actual parallels are not quite so neat (Kimble, 1961) but this is the position Eysenck (1954) assumes.

There is very substantial evidence to show that, in Great Britain, the United States, and elsewhere, political attitudes, party affiliations, and voting are all closely related to socio-economic status. The nature of the relationship is, of course, that people of higher status are more likely to be conservative while persons of lower status are more likely to be radical. This, declares Eysenck, is simply the operation of the Law of Effect in social life. Each social class has learned to adopt the attitudes and take the political actions that bring reinforcement. The upper classes have been rewarded by conservatism and vote accordingly; for the lower classes it is radicalism that pays. Converse (1958) has shown that the strength of the relationship between politics and socio-economic status has not been constant from one American presidential election to another. In the United States it has been greater in times of economic need than in times of affluence and it is probably when economic goods are scarce that class interests are most sharply divided.

The argument connecting tender-minded and tough-minded attitudes with classical conditioning is a little bit complex. The visceral response experienced as fear which might be conditioned to a buzzer is not directly useful or agreeable. It can, however, have great survival value for the organism since it can serve as a signal of danger. The buzzer that forewarns of shock may motivate the rat to take some action that will enable it to avoid the shock. Mowrer (1950) has very effectively argued that this kind of conditioned fear is for human beings a major part of the socialization process. It may be that parental punishments condition us to feel fear when we depart from community standards. It may be classically conditioned fear that restrains us from brute aggres-

sion and unlawful sexuality. Perhaps conformity to every sort of norm is maintained by the conditioned fear that follows upon deviance.

Some of the attitudes that Eysenck calls "tough-minded" are concerned with violent aggression (e.g., war is inevitable, criminals should be flogged, etc.) and some would seem to provide for rather free sexual experience (birth control, easy divorce, and legal acceptance of abortion are all desirable). In order to hold such attitudes a person would have to be comparatively free of socialized fear. Could we not argue that the tough-minded are undersocialized, relatively free of conditioned fears, while the tender-minded are oversocialized, heavily inhibited by fears. Remember now that communists and fascists are supposed to be tough-minded. Nazism is renowned for brutality, libertinism, and sexual perversion; Stalinist communism was known for brutality.

What could cause individual variations in the degree of socialized inhibition? Eysenck suggests two possibilities. The variations may result from differences in individual conditionability. Pavlov (1941) noticed marked differences in the ease with which his experimental animals acquired conditioned reflexes and he suggested that such differences in humans might be a basis of important personality differences. There is much evidence of individual differences in conditionality for human subjects in particular experimental situations (Eysenck, 1957; Franks, 1961). In part, then, individuals may be predisposed to tender-mindedness and tough-mindedness by innate conditionability.

In the second place, undersocialization could result from a life history in which there has been little training in socialization. If parents do not punish their children will not learn inhibiting fears. In some of Eysenck's data members of the working class are more tough-minded and members of the middle classes more tender-minded. The first Kinsey report seemed to Eysenck to reveal that the working classes were less inhibited sexually than the middle classes. The work of Allison Davis (1947) in America suggested that the working classes were also less inhibited about physical aggression than were the middle classes. Eysenck concludes that class differences in the amount of socializing pressure account for class differences on the T dimension with conditioned fear the mediating variable.

There is even more than this to Eysenck's grand integration. High conditionability and tender-mindedness are linked to the personality variable called "introversion" and to the pathological condition called "anxiety neurosis." The contrasting state of low conditionability and tough-mindedness are linked to extraversion and to the neurotic state called "hysteria." For this total integration he supplies some new evidence of his own and shows how a large amount of evidence collected by others can be interpreted as supportive (Eysenck, 1957; 1961).

R and T in Actual Relation to Fascism and Communism. It is Eysenck's resolution of our quandary concerning fascism and communism that constitutes the strongest appeal of his two dimensional theory of political attitudes. The resolution pictured as Figure 10-1b is a schematic diagram not a drawing from data. Is it, in fact, the case that communists and fascists resemble one another by virtue of their tough-mindedness? There are two major research findings in support of the claim but both have been seriously questioned.

There is in the first place, Coulter's (1953) study which was mentioned above. The subjects were 43 Communists, 43 Fascists and 83 "neutral" working men. On the F Scale, you recall, the neutrals were extraordinarily equalitarian in comparison with the many other American and British groups who have filled out that scale. The Communists had slightly higher F scores than the neutrals but were still on the equalitarian side of neutrality. The Fascists had much higher scores than the other two groups and in fact scored higher in authoritarianism than any other groups that have been tested. These same subjects were given scales that measure the R and T factors. The crucial data for Eysenck's two-factor analysis of political parties are the T scores; Communists and Fascists ought to have similar scores and both should be more tough-minded than neutrals.

Curiously enough Eysenck does not report the mean scores of the three groups but Christie (1956a) has been able to estimate them from the data that are reported. The higher the score on this scale the greater the tender-mindedness. For neutrals the mean is 14.2; for Communists 11.05; for Fascists 7.85. Does this pattern constitute confirmation or disconfirmation? Eysenck construes it as confirmatory; he notes that both Fascists and Communists are more tough-minded than neutrals. Christie, in a critique (1956a), sees it differently. After all the Communists are almost exactly midway between neutrals and Fascists and so best described as intermediate in tough-mindedness rather than as similar to Fascists. Beyond that, remember that this neutral group produced very exceptionally low F Scale scores and F Scale scores are correlated with T Scale scores. The probability is that the neutrals were extraordinarily tender-minded and the Communists only about average in tough-mindedness for British working-class males.

There is one other major study cited by Eysenck in support of his thesis that Communists and Fascists are similar to one another in that both groups are very tough-minded. This was a study done by Eysenck himself (1954), utilizing groups of middle- and working-class members of the Liberal, Socialist, and Communist parties. In accordance with prediction the Communist mean T Scale score is the lowest of the three. However, Rokeach and Hanley (1956) have looked at the item-by-item

TABLE 10-4. FREQUENCY OF RESPONSES BY CONSERVATIVES, LIBERALS, SOCIALISTS, AND COMMUNISTS TO THE ITEMS ON THE TENDER-MINDEDNESS SCALE

Item and direction of scoring	Class	PROPORTION OF "YES" ANSWERS			
		Conservative	Liberal	Socialist	Communist
<i>Items on which Communists are most tender-minded:</i>					
1. Coloured people are innately inferior to white people. (T -)	Middle	.42	.27	.19	.00
	Working	.30	.33	.16	.06
3. War is inherent in human nature. (T -)	Middle	.67	.57	.34	.02
	Working	.70	.67	.60	.02
5. Persons with serious hereditary defects and diseases should be compulsorily sterilized. (T -)	Middle	.69	.59	.63	.46
	Working	.96	.83	.89	.71
8. In the interests of peace, we should give up part of our national sovereignty. (T +)	Middle	.32	.60	.76	.74
	Working	.37	.38	.50	.65
10. It is wrong that men should be permitted greater sexual freedom than women by society. (T +)	Middle	.66	.71	.80	.93
	Working	.74	.78	.76	.91
13. Conscientious objectors are traitors to their country and should be treated accordingly. (T -)	Middle	.28	.16	.09	.02
	Working	.67	.22	.27	.06
36. The death penalty is barbaric, and should be abolished. (T +)	Middle	.30	.42	.64	.96
	Working	.19	.11	.20	.83
39. The Japanese are by nature a cruel people (T -)	Middle	.58	.37	.19	.00
	Working	.74	.44	.27	.06
<i>Items on which Communists are most tough-minded:</i>					
9. Sunday-observance is old-fashioned, and should cease to govern our behaviour. (T -)	Middle	.36	.44	.68	.92
	Working	.59	.33	.69	.95
15. The laws against abortion should be abolished. (T -)	Middle	.28	.40	.53	.90
	Working	.33	.11	.51	.65
16. Only by going back to religion can civilization hope to survive. (T +)	Middle	.65	.56	.36	.00
	Working	.74	.61	.27	.05
23. Divorce laws should be altered to make divorce easier. (T -)	Middle	.33	.42	.61	.96
	Working	.37	.22	.53	.91
28. It is right and proper that religious education in schools should be compulsory. (T +)	Middle	.66	.55	.32	.00
	Working	.70	.78	.13	.05
29. Men and women have the right to find out whether they are sexually suited before marriage (e.g., by companionate marriage). (T -)	Middle	.35	.40	.62	.98
	Working	.37	.22	.36	.77

data and uncovered a startling fact: Of fourteen T Scale items the Communists were the most tough-minded on six items but they were the most tender-minded on the remaining eight items. What is more there is a consistent difference of content between the set of six and the set of eight which suggests that it is highly misleading to call the Communists tough-minded.

Table 10-4 shows the patterns of response for the total set of fourteen items. Rokeach and Hanley suggest that the eight tender-minded responses of Communists might best be conceptualized as "humanitarian" while the six tough-minded responses might best be conceptualized as "anti-religious." The data have not been reported which would show how the tough-mindedness of Fascists breaks down item by item. It is possible, however, that they would tend to be tough where the Communists were tender and tender where the Communists were tough. Communists would then be humanitarian and anti-religious while Fascists would be religious and inhumane. The two might not be similar at all.

The factor analysis from which the unitary T factor emerged was done on data from Conservatives, Liberals and Socialists; no Fascists or Communists were included. A factor structure found in one set of scores cannot be taken as the invariable structure of scores on the tests in question. Members of moderate political parties might tend to reject or accept the views of extremist parties as a unitary set. But the members of the extremist parties, Fascists and Communists, might accept one sort of extremist view and reject the other, destroying the unity of the factor. For a sample that includes both Fascists and Communists there might be no T factor.

The rancorous debate between Eysenck (1956a and 1956b) on the one side and Christie (1956a and 1956b), Rokeach and Hanley (1956) on the other as to whether communists are tough-minded is a very complicated one. I have only reported what I consider to be the more deadly criticisms of Eysenck's position—and I do think they are deadly. The conclusion that has the best chance of being correct is, I think, that fascists and communists in democratic countries are not equally tough-minded in the same sense of the term. If there is indeed a similarity between the two ideologies it seems to lie elsewhere.

ROKEACH'S DOGMATISM

Rokeach (1960) has a suggestion of his own as to what is wrong with communists that is also wrong with fascists. He is convinced that the F Scale is a measure of right-authoritarianism rather than authoritarianism in general. A measure of general authoritarianism, he suggests, must be free

of ideological content since it is to be found in people of every political persuasion as well as in Freudians, Unitarians, and art critics. In short, general authoritarianism is best conceived as a mode of thought rather than as a set of beliefs. In identifying intolerance of ambiguity and rigidity as characteristics of authoritarian thought the Berkeley investigators came nearer the identification of general authoritarianism than they did with the F Scale. Rokeach has chosen to call the cognitive style that is general authoritarianism by the name *dogmatism*. He provides an elaborate conceptualization of dogmatism, which is far from identical with popular understanding of that term, and then goes on to construct a questionnaire measure of the concept.

Rokeach does not report data on Fascists but he did manage to find some Communists in England, all students and only thirteen of them. Both the F Scale and the Dogmatism Scale were given to five English groups. As we have seen the Communists obtained the most equalitarian mean score of all five groups and this mean was significantly lower than the means of Conservatives, Liberals, and Atlee-ite Labor Party members. Only the Bevanite left wing of the Labor Party was not significantly higher than the Communists. These results indicate that the F Scale is indeed a measure of authoritarianism of the right and Communists are not high on that measure. Are they high on Dogmatism, which is put forward as a measure of general authoritarianism?

On the Dogmatism Scale the Communists have the highest mean score of all five groups. However, none of the differences between the means attains a conventional level of statistical significance; the difference between Liberals and Communists comes close. No data are presented on the Dogmatism of explicit Fascists.

CONCLUSION

My conclusion, then, is that it has not been demonstrated that fascists and communists resemble one another in authoritarianism or in any other dimension of ideology. No one thus far has shown that there is an authoritarian of the left. Still the impression persists that such a type exists and that some communists belong to it. I believe that both Rokeach and the Berkeley authors have, at several points in their writings, hit upon a promising characterization of general authoritarianism but it is not the characterization they develop or use as the basis of their scales. Perhaps the authoritarian is a person who is best characterized by the kind of information that will induce him to change his attitudes (see Chapter 11). The authoritarian will reverse his evaluations on the simple say-so of an authority figure. If Stalin signs a pact with Berlin then Nazism

becomes acceptable for the authoritarian Communist; if Khrushchev devaluates Stalin the Communist authoritarian does the same. The authoritarian liberal would change his views on Communism if Franklin Roosevelt had told him to do so. I would characterize the authoritarian in terms of the kind of information that is sufficient to induce a change of his attitudes.

The non-authoritarian will also change his attitudes but the requisite information is different. The endorsement of an authority will not be sufficient. Most generally he will need to see that the objects of his attitude are related to his more basic values in ways that he had not formerly realized. This is by no means a completely "logical" business and it is not clear that the contrast of authoritarian and non-authoritarian is on a dimension of rationality. I am simply proposing that it is a difference in the weight given to the unsupported opinions of an authority.

The proposed definition is dynamic rather than static. One could not diagnose authoritarianism from an inventory of beliefs but only from knowledge of the circumstances that will change belief. This means that the measurement problem is certain to be more difficult than when authoritarianism is defined in static terms and so one can understand a reluctance to accept such a definition.

By the proposed definitions not all communists will be authoritarian, not all fascists, and not all liberals. It is, however, possible that dynamic authoritarianism would be more often found in conjunction with some ideologies than with others. The focus on single, enduring, and very powerful authorities in fascist and communist states suggests that dynamic authoritarianism may be more common there than in democratic states. The apparent popular acceptance of radical transformations of attitude on little more than the say-so of dictators suggests that this is the case. When Russia invaded Hungary there were wholesale defections from European Communist parties which argues that many members were not dynamic authoritarians. On the other hand there were many who swallowed the Hungary treatment and also de-Stalinization and also the Soviet-German pact before the war.

The idea that all persons affiliated with an extremist political party should have the same personality characteristics is much too simple-minded. It is some improvement to recognize the kinds of personality differences among people adhering to a common ideology that are suggested by a dynamic conception of authoritarianism. But there are other differences that must exist. As Lasswell (1954) has argued an organization as complex as a political party must have a great variety of differentiated roles. The Nazi Party had use for a great many rigid, sado-masochistic, anti-intrceptive, anti-Semites of the kind described in the Berkeley study. But it also had need of clever propagandists, clear-

thinking ministers, sensitive diplomats, and courageous military men. There may be some essential quality that occupants of all of these roles had to have in order to be Nazis but, in addition, they had to have distinctive characteristics. An institutionalized political movement could not have operated with personalities of a completely uniform type.

The Berkeley study of the authoritarian personality does not leave many people indifferent. Cool objectivity has not been the hallmark of this tradition. Most of those who have participated have cared deeply about the social issues involved. If it has been difficult for any one investigator to avoid ideological bias there have always been others of contrary bias to keep the argument moving in the direction of truth.

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Part Five

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL

PROCESSES

PROCESS is change and in the next four chapters we go in quest of laws of change for attitudes, impressions of persons, groups, and large collectivities. The abstract problem is this. A certain structured state at time₁ (T₁) is transformed into another structured state at time₂ (T₂) and various events have intervened. In what ways are such transformations lawful?

The following are some T₁ states of attitude, impression, small group, and large assemblage. A collector of Korean pottery has purchased, very cheaply, a celadon bowl that he considers superb and now excitedly shows it to an esteemed friend who is curator of a famous museum's collection of Oriental art. A psychologist from the Soviet Union is met at the airport by several American colleagues and impresses them as a cold, taciturn, but brilliant man. Six unacquainted graduate students assembled for the first meeting of a seminar sit apart from one another and leave the talking to the instructor. Ten thousand opera-lovers assembled in the